# 1AC

## 1AC---DPS


### 1AC---Crisis

#### Advantage 1 is Crisis:


#### Marx’s law of profitability explains cyclical recessions and renders capitalism unsustainable


Roberts 15 - London economist citing PhD economists (Michael, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/12/29/the-marxist-theory-of-economic-crises-in-capitalism-part-two/, emuse)

Does Marx’s law fit the facts? Some Marxist critics of Marx’s law of profitability reckon that the law cannot be empirically proven or refuted because official statistics cannot be used to show Marx’s law in operation. But there are plenty of studies by Marxist economists that show otherwise. The key tests of the validity of the law in modern capitalist economies would be to show whether 1) the rate of profit falls over time as the organic composition of capital rises; 2) the rate of profit rises when the organic composition falls or when the rate of surplus value rises faster than the organic composition of capital; 3) the rate of profit rises, if there is sharp fall in the organic composition of capital as in a slump. These would be the empirical tests and there is plenty of empirical evidence for the US and world economy to show that the answer is yes to all these questions. For example, [Basu and Manolakos](http://gesd.free.fr/basumano.pdf) applied econometric analysis to the US economy between 1948 and 2007 and found that there was a secular tendency for the rate of profit to fall with a measurable decline of about 0.3 percent a year “after controlling for counter-tendencies.” In [my work on the US rate of profit,](http://gesd.free.fr/mr1213.pdf) I also found an average decline of 0.4 percent a year through 2009. And here is a figure by G Carchedi for the rise in the organic composition of capital (OCC) in the industrial sector of the US since 1947 versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V) versus the average rate of profit (ARP). It tells the same story. US ARP and OCC (i.e. C/V)


[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/arp.png)

There is a clear inverse correlation between a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit. Can Marx’s law explain crises? How does Marx’s law of profitability work as an explanation and forecast of slumps in capitalist economies? The law leads to a clear causal connection to regular and recurrent crises (slumps). It runs from falling profitability to falling profits to falling investment to falling employment and incomes. A bottom is reached when there is sufficient destruction of capital values (the writing off technology, the bankruptcy of companies, a reduction in wage costs) to raise profits and then profitability. Then rising profitability leads to rising investment again. The cycle of boom recommences and the whole ‘crap’ starts again, to use Marx’s colourful phrase. [There is a cycle of profit alongside the long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall.](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/cycles-in-capitalism.pdf)

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profit-cycle.png) The evidence of this causality between profit and investment is available. Jose Tapia Granados, using regression analysis, finds that, over 251 quarters of US economic activity from 1947, profits started declining long before investment did and that pre-tax profits can explain 44% of all movement in investment, while there is no evidence that investment can explain any movement in profits. I find a higher ‘Granger causality’ of 60% from annual changes in profit and investment (unpublished) and a correlation of 0.67 for the period since 2000. And see this by G Carchedi ([Carchedi Presentation](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/carchedi-presentation.pptx)). In the period leading up to the Great Recession 2008-9, we can see the causality visually for US profits, investment and real GDP in the graphic below. The mass of US corporate profit peaks in mid-2006, investment and GDP follows two years later. Profits turn back up in late 2008 and investment follows one year later.

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/profits-lead.png)

There are two basic regularities shown by the data: that a change in profits tends to be followed next year by a change in investment in the same direction; and that a change in investment is usually followed in a few years by changes in profits in the opposite direction. Thus we have a cycle. From these results, the “regularity” of the business cycle, and the fact that profitability stagnated in 2013 and declined in 2014 (and now the mass of profits in 2015) after growing between 2008 and 2012, it can be concluded with some confidence that a recession of the US economy, which will be also part of a world economic crisis like the Great Recession, will occur again in the next few years. And Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall makes an even more fundamental prediction: that the capitalist mode of production will not be eternal, that it is transitory in the history of human social organisation. The law of the tendency predicts that, over time, there will be a fall in the rate of profit globally, delivering more crises of a devastating character. Work has been done by modern Marxist analysis that confirms that the world rate of profit has fallen over the last 150 years. See the graph below ([data from Esteban Maito](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/maito-esteban-the-historical-transience-of-capital-the-downward-tren-in-the-rate-of-profit-since-xix-century.pdfhttp:/gesd.free.fr/mrwrate.pdf) and ‘doctored’ by me).

[](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/world-rate-of-profit-maito.png) Maito’s data for the 19th century have recently been questioned ([DUMENIL-LEVY on MAITO](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/dumenil-levy-on-maito.pdf)), but in a recent work using different sources and countries, I find a similar trend for the post-1945 period globally ([Revisiting a world rate of profit June 2015](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/revisiting-a-world-rate-of-profit-june-2015.pdf)). And earlier groundbreaking work by Minqi Li and colleagues, as well as by Dave Zachariah, show a similar trend. As Maito concludes: “The tendency of the rate of profit to fall and its empirical confirmation highlights the historically limited nature of capitalist production. If the rate of profit measures the vitality of the capitalist system, the logical conclusion is that it is getting closer to its endpoint. There are many ways that capital can attempt to overcome crises and regenerate constantly. Periodic crises are specific to the capitalist mode of production and allow, ultimately, a partial recovery of profitability. This is a characteristic aspect of capital and the cyclical nature of the capitalist economy. But the periodic nature of these crises has not stopped the downward trend of the rate of profit over the long term. So the arguments claiming that there is an inexhaustible capacity of capital to restore the rate of profit and its own vitality and which therefore considers the capitalist mode of production as a natural and a-historical phenomenon, are refuted by the empirical evidence.” So the law predicts that, as the organic composition of capital rises globally, the rate of profit will fall despite counteracting factors and despite successive crises (which temporarily help to restore profitability). This shows that capital as a mode of production and social relations is transient. Capitalism has not always been here and it has ultimate limits, namely capital itself. It has a ‘use-by-date’. That is the essence of the law of profitability for Marx. Alternative theories This is not to deny other factors in capitalist crises. The role of credit is an important part of Marxist crisis theory and indeed, as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall engenders countertendencies, one of increasing importance is the expansion of credit and the switching of surplus value into investment in fictitious capital rather than productive capital to raise profitability temporarily, but with eventually disastrous consequences, as The Great Recession shows ([The Great Recession](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/the-great-recession.pdf); [Debt matters](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/debt-matters.pdf)). Alternative theories of crisis like underconsumption, or the lack of effective demand, are taken from theories from the reactionary Thomas Malthus and the radical Sismondi in the early 19th century and then taken up by Keynes in the 1930s and by modern inequality theorists like Stiglitz and [post-Keynesian economists](http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=15854). But lack of demand and rising inequality cannot explain the regularity of crises or predict the next one. These theories do not have strong empirical backing either ([Does inequality causes crises](https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/does-inequality-causes-crises.pdf)). Professor Heinrich, after concluding that Marx did not have a theory of crisis and dropped the law of profitability, [does offer a vague one of his own](https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/05/19/the-two-michaels-heinrich-and-roberts-in-berlin-dogmatism-versus-doubt/): namely capital accumulates and produces more means of production blindly. This gets out of line with consumption demand from workers. So a ‘gap’ develops that has to be filled by credit, but somehow this cannot hold up things indefinitely and production then collapses. Well, it is a sort of a theory, but pretty much the same as the underconsumption (overproduction) theory that Heinrich himself dismisses and [Marx dismissed 150 years ago.](http://www.mcg-j.org/swp_arc/english/etheory/economics/eprm29-2.htm) It seems way less convincing or empirically supported that Marx’s own theory of crisis based on the law of profitability. No other theory, whether from mainstream economics or from heterodox economics, can explain recurrent and regular crises and offer a clear objective foundation for the transience of the capitalist system.

#### Profitability will hit zero by 2054---but converging tipping points ensure collapse much sooner

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.patreon.com/posts/socialism-is-now-37023695>, emuse)

That capitalism is unsustainable has long been empirically observable. Most obviously, manufacturing costs and consumer commodity prices are trending towards zero. For example, whereas the world’s fastest supercomputer in 1975 was worth $5m ($32m in 2013’s money), the price of an iPhone 4 released in 2010 with the equivalent performance was $400. Aerospace companies producing propulsion systems in 2010 for $24m in 24 months are now 3-D printing their engines for $2,000 in two weeks. And rather than having globalised supply chains, such companies foresee the entire rocket being built in ‘at home’ [7]. While ‘offshoring’ manufacturing jobs to the ‘low-income economies’ is said to save up to 65% on labour costs, replacing human workers with robots saves up to 90% [8]. Unlike workers, robots do not need wages, breaks, sick days, holidays or pensions. And they work quicker in the first place, too. While industrialisation, particularly in Asia, saw 83 ‘developing countries’ achieving growth rates by the early 2000s that were more than twice the rate of the ‘developed’ OECD members, the rest of the world has seen the same opportunity end ‘prematurely’. Latin America and Africa are already deindustrialising (shifting to services-based workforces) – from a much lower starting point than Asia [9]. Whereas industrialisation peaked in western European countries at income levels of around $14,000, India and many sub-Saharan African countries appear to have reached their peak manufacturing employment at income levels of $700 (both at 1990 levels) [10]. Not only do robots and 3D-printing increasingly remove the incentive for capitalists based in the US and Europe to exploit workers overseas, the incentive to exploit transit workers – who add production time/value to the commodities they transport around the world – is also removed [11]. The emergence of cellular agriculture (lab-grown food), with falling prices and rising quality estimated to see the beef industry go bust by 2035, is going to have the same effect [12]. For the past 145 years, the imperialist powers – the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan – have been increasingly compelled to export capital (invest) overseas in order to expand and cheapen their exploitable labour bases, thereby sustaining their own economies by living off profits generated by commodity-producing workers in the ‘developing world’. Britain, for example, exported capital equal to 560% of its GDP in 2014 [13]. Between 1980 and 2012 the net outflows of capital from ‘developing’ countries being funnelled into ‘developed’, ie imperialist nations, totalled $16.3 trillion [14]. But the economic relation that underpins imperialism is now unravelling. If prices are trending historically towards zero, so too must the ‘global’ aggregate rate of profit. According to Estaban Maito’s estimates, it fell in a secular trend from 43% in the 1870s to 17% in the 2000s, and is (as of 2014) on course to reach zero around 2054 [15]. Automation and absolute overaccumulation But as the criminally under-appreciated Polish Marxist Henryk Grossman warned in 1929, capitalism is bound to collapse “much earlier than a zero rate of profit” [16], because capital, inherently, does not accumulate harmoniously – the process tends to break down. Overaccumulated capital – surplus capital that has become unprofitable to reinvest – is inevitable. It causes every recession, a partial and temporary breakdown, and is at the same time an underproduction of surplus value; ie, too little profit has been generated to preserve and expand the value of total capital. (Surplus value, or surplus labour time, is the amount of value the capitalist appropriates from the worker, who, on average, keeps only what they need to subsist, their necessary labour time. Profit then is essentially unpaid labour, which tends to increase with innovation. Hence falling prices.) Debt therefore rises to ‘fill the gap’ caused by this underproduction, but can only cover the lag in profit for so long before recession becomes inevitable, since investors are bound to withdraw funds when growth becomes too stagnant, channelling this new surplus instead into tax havens, land and the competitive gambling of speculation that generates financial ‘bubbles’. Each breakdown is overcome through the sufficient destruction, cheapening and centralisation of capital. But the resulting innovation means fewer workers tend to remain employed relative to total capital. Despite the increased rate of exploitation that temporarily lifts profit rates, the next overaccumulation tends to be greater than the one which preceded it. There is no such thing as ‘technological unemployment’ though – alongside surplus capital grows unexploitable surplus labour (unemployment). Clearly, the closer we get to the completion of the historical trend towards fully-automated production, the closer capitalism gets to its final breakdown. Production is already highly automated. As James Manyika, McKinsey Global Institute director, said in June 2017: “Find a factory anywhere in the world built in the past five years  –  not many people work there.” But the services jobs – relatively unproductive since they tend to handle near-finished commodities, if they handle commodities at all – that replaced manufacturing work are now becoming increasingly automated, too. In Britain, where services count for 80% of economic activity, the number of supermarket checkout assistants fell by 25.3% between 2011 and 2017. At the end of March, after most countries had entered lockdown, almost half of company bosses in 45 countries said they were speeding up plans to automate their businesses. [17] Innovation always takes place most rapidly during a recession, when prices are low. With lockdown turning the home into the place of work, Microsoft could boast of having discovered a fresh way of reducing labour costs and extending absolute labour time as it announced “two years’ worth of digital transformation in two months”. As The Guardian reported at the end of April: “Bank branches were already closing in droves before the epidemic, but here is the perfect excuse to shut more. And that’s not all. The authors of an Oxford University study thought that by 2035 it would be possible to automate 86% of restaurant jobs, three-quarters of retail jobs, and 59% of recreation jobs. By unlucky coincidence, those are among the very industries hardest hit by an epidemic now demanding quantum leaps in efficiency if some companies are to avoid going under.” [18] But automation is abolishing the source of profit, ie, commodity-producing human labour. To be more precise, automation is the final expression of capitalism’s self-abolishing tendency. As Marx wrote in 1858: “As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great wellspring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure... Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.” [19] But this dissolution does not happen in a seamless falling rate of profit towards zero, since – as explained, and as indicated by both zig-zagging profit rates and the recessions that tend to strike roughly every 10 years – capital does not accumulate harmoniously. As the Soviet Russian philosopher Genrikh Volkov wrote in 1967, increasing automation eventually leads to “the breakdown, instead of the consolidation, of the existing relations ... of the private ownership of the means of production…. Its consummation is incompatible with capitalism.” [20] In Capital, Marx anticipates an eventual “absolute overaccumulation” of capital. “The limit of capitalist production is the excess time of the labourers,” says Marx. [21] But stretching the rate of exploitation of the working class to anywhere near 100% is obviously impossible – for starters, capital cannot even afford to exploit an ever-increasing part of it, a surplus population that grows alongside surplus capital, while workers in the growing services sector are also relatively unproductive. “As the capitalist mode of production develops, an ever larger quantity of capital is required to employ the same, let alone an increased, amount of labour-power.” But there are other limits too: “As soon as capital would, therefore, have grown in such a ratio to the labouring population that neither the absolute working time supplied by this population, nor the relative surplus working time, could be expanded any further (this last would not be feasible at any rate in the case where the demand for labour were so strong that there were a tendency for wages to rise); at a point, therefore when the increased capital produced just as much, or even less, surplus value than it did before its increase, there would be absolute overproduction of capital.” [22] From zero interest rates to worldwide hyperinflation If the rate of profit is on course to hit zero around 2054, but the final breakdown is bound to happen much earlier than that, it at least becomes impossible to dismiss the theory that we are entering this uncharted territory right now. But empirically, there also seem to be several approaching economic limits or ‘tipping points’ which cannot be converging at the same time merely by coincidence. For starters, average GDP growth rates in what the World Bank defines as ‘high income countries’ are already closing in on zero, having fallen every decade for the past half century: from 5.59% in the 1960s, to 4.15% in the 1970s, 2.93% in the 1980s, 2.35% in the 1990s, and 1.78% in the 2000s. The figure rose slightly to 1.97% in the years 2010-2017, but this minor reprieve has already proven to be unsustainable. GDP in the imperialist nations, though, is inflated by the profits leached from the rest of the world, since much of the profit from each commodity goes towards the GDP of the nation in which it is sold, rather than where it was made. [23] Productivity growth in the high income countries has itself, since 2011, spluttered below 1%. Aggregate global debt (the total debt of governments, corporations and households), already mountainous before the Great Recession, has hit new heights, indicating record-high overaccumulation [24]. According to the IMF, global debt fell by 1.5% of GDP in 2017 compared to a year earlier, but remained more than 11 percentage points of GDP above the previous high in 2009. In June 2019, the IMF said global debt stood officially at $184 trillion, 225% of global GDP. This averages out at $86,000 for every person in the world, 2.5 times average annual per capita income. But according to financial analyst Ron Surz, once ‘off-the-books’ net obligations such as social security and health care are taken into account, official figures are understated by a factor of 2.5, making actual global debt $460 trillion, 560% of GDP and $215,000 per person (as of July 2019) [25]. He put the US figure not at the official 105%, but 390%. Even that is without taking into account the serious accounting problem in the US Department of Defense. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion [26]. The US defence budget has ballooned to $748bn as the long-time imperialist superpower scrambles to hold on to its dying empire. Another financial analyst, Simon Thorpe, calculated in 2015 that global debt was 2.5 times higher than the global money supply (up from two times higher in 2013) [27]. This is despite the fact that the US’s monetary base exploded from $842bn in August 2008 to $2.9 trillion in January 2013 and then $4 trillion in August 2014. The sheer amount of debt is unsustainable since the tax base needed to pay it is obviously shrinking in relative terms. Though it has been socialised, it is now simply too large to work off. Something the capitalist state can do to ease the government’s ability to pay its debt is reduce interest rates, which also makes borrowing cheaper and stimulates lending, maintaining the circulation of money. But lifting the economy out of recession usually takes a 4-5% base interest rate cut. In the US and across Europe base rates are already at zero, having been cut by around only 2%. Central banks have said going negative would make the banks unviable. Therefore, it is highly probable – lockdown or no lockdown – that capitalism, as Pento says, is soon going to spiral for the first time in its history into a crisis of worldwide hyperinflation, since rates will have to start going back up to re-incentivise bond holding and sustain the tax base. But debt-to-GDP – already at record highs and rising – will surge, and so the tax base will continue to shrink; bondholders will realise that what they are owed cannot be repaid and increasingly transfer their funds into hard assets, especially precious metals. The only way to avoid hyperinflation is for states to default on their debt through hyperdeflation – which the record bailouts imply they are understandably trying to avoid – but that would happen after hyperinflation anyway. The US’s national annual deficit is now expected to soar from $984bn in 2019 to $3.8 trillion in 2020. The US has never meaningfully defaulted on its debt but, historically, countries that have failed to get their debt-to-GDP back below 90% have gone on to default, meaning they have had to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bail out (usually in the form of high-interest loans and on the condition of privatising state assets). But given that the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency – all oil must be traded in US dollars, for example, making the solvency of all countries dependent on their ability to purchase US dollars – the IMF effectively is the US. The US dollar has lost more than 96% of its value, its purchasing power, since 1913. The figure is more than 99.5% for British pound sterling, compared to 1694, the year it was founded [28]. This is why negative rates would make the banks unviable – they would finish off the depreciation of fiat currency. Many countries, including Russia and China, have started diversifying their foreign currency reserves in the past few years, meaning the main source of financing US debt is disappearing. Even the biggest US bank, JP Morgan, told its clients in August 2019 to sell the dollar. The world economy will likely soon be without a reserve currency. While smaller economies have survived defaults through bailouts in the past, the US and western European countries are the richest and most developed in the world. They represent monopoly capitalism, or imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. As mentioned, with their workforces now largely services-based, the imperialist nations have been largely living off of profit produced by the labour of commodity-producing workers in Africa, Asia and South America. If the imperialist economies collapse, it’s because the whole system has collapsed. Indeed, as of 7 March, investors had already pulled $83bn from developing markets, the largest capital outflow ever recorded, according to the Institute of International Finance. If all these converging factors – near-zero prices, flat productivity growth, unsustainably high debt, zero interest rates, exhausted currencies – do not constitute a final breakdown of the system, then what will?

#### Mounting dysfunction drives imperialism and inter-capitalist competition---risks nuclear war

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

We have seen that the crisis is intensifying competition between the major imperialist and capitalist powers. The counter-tendencies have failed to prevent the onset of the next crisis. An even greater devaluation of capital and labour power is required. The death and destruction wrought by war is the ultimate source of devaluation and therefore the most important counter-tendency. If war wasn’t an inevitability under capitalism, militarism would be done away with since it is funded through taxation that could otherwise be put towards productive capital. Many Marxists have failed to grasp this. Luxemburg, for example, claimed that “from the purely economic point of view, militarism is a pre-eminent means for the realisation of surplus-value; it is in itself a sphere of accumulation”.[496] Again, her analysis was based on circulation, not production. Grossman counters that “this is how things may appear from the standpoint of individual capital as military supplies have always been the occasion for rapid enrichment. But from the standpoint of the total capital, militarism is a sphere of unproductive consumption. Instead of being saved, values are pulverised. Far from being a sphere of accumulation, militarism slows down accumulation. By means of indirect taxation a major share of the income of the working class which might have gone into the hands of the capitalists as surplus value is seized by the state and spent mainly for unproductive purposes.” On the other hand, though, apart from natural resources, the main resource the capitalists are fighting over in a war is human labour, enough of which is not available at home. What better way to decimate the wages of this new source of surplus value than through warfare? And as well as the destruction of capital value, innovation is accelerated by the arms race, leading to new use-values for the post- war civilian economy and furthering devaluation. Idealists claimed the fall of the Soviet Union would bring about a new era of world peace. The destruction of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen since then shows both that they did not appreciate the nature of imperialism or the protection the Soviet Union afforded to countries threatened by imperialism. Who is next for daring to seek independence? Venezuela? Iran? Russia and China have been encircled by NATO in the biggest build- up of military forces since the Second World War. As the crisis of accumulation deepens, the size and frequency of wars tend to grow. In the wake of 9/11, the author Zoltan Grossman circulated a list, based on Congressional Records and The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, of 133 US military interventions from 1890 to 2001. The average per year is 1.15 before, and 1.29 after, the Second World War. After the Cold War, from late 1989, the figure rises to 2.0. The Democrat Barack Obama replaced the gung-ho Republican warmonger George W Bush in 2008 promising ‘hope’ and ‘change’. But by the end of his second term in 2016, US special operators could be found in 70% – 138 – of the world’s nations, a huge jump of 130% since Bush left office. In 2016 alone, the Obama administration sanctioned the use of at least 26,171 bombs. “This means that every day last year, the US military blasted combatants or civilians overseas with 72 bombs; that’s three bombs every hour, 24 hours a day,” Medea Benjamin of the anti-war CodePink wrote in The Guardian.[500] In 2017, Trump – who in his April 2016 foreign policy speech said that “war and aggression will not be my first instinct” because he wanted to spend the money instead domestically to ‘make America great again’ – outstripped Obama’s 2016 figure by 9,000. Given that many of these wars are fought in an alliance of the imperialist powers, mainly through NATO, much analysis on the Left makes the mistake of thinking that inter-imperialist rivalry no longer exists. This follows on from Kautsky who, because he did not see war as arising from economic necessity, came up with a theory of “ultra- imperialism” whereby the imperialists would realise that it was not in their interests to continue the First World War and would therefore unite to “peaceably redivide the world". Something like this – to a limited extent – did temporarily emerge, but only after the Second World War, only in collective opposition to the Soviet Union, and during a period in which capitalism was recovering in the wake of the war’s devaluation of capital, meaning competition had temporarily diminished. But the barbaric aggression of the wars on the Middle East is symptomatic of deepening capitalist crisis and intensifying rivalry. Through their opposition to the 2003 war on Iraq, France and Germany showed that they are not subordinate to US interests. In the 1990s, TotalFinaElf, France’s huge oil firm, secured the contract to develop Iraq’s southern Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields, containing as much as 25% of the country's reserves. German firms were the market leaders in supplying sensitive dual-use technology to Iraq in the years before the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and they had been bidding for more civilian commercial contracts. Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi defector, called Germany “the hub of Iraq's military purchases in the 1980s”. France and Germany did not want new competition. Between the start of 2002 to March 2003 the dollar fell by 20% against the euro. The US had to respond to this: its international economic domination is bound up with the dollar’s strength as the world’s currency anchor. The dollar’s dominance as the main currency for foreign exchange enables it to blackmail countries that do not yield to its demands. Ultimately, the strength of a currency reflects the productivity and size of the economy behind it. Trump’s administration has claimed that Germany is using its currency to “exploit” both its neighbours and the US, sparking fears of a currency war. The US made the desperate accusation that Germany is “under-consuming” goods and services from other countries. At the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, the US made an unsuccessful attempt to limit the size of current account surpluses to 4% of GDP. Germany’s surplus overtook China’s in absolute size in 2017 and as a share of GDP became much larger. The IMF put Germany’s 2017 surplus as 8.1% of GDP and China’s at 1.6%. The EU’s surplus as a whole in 2017 was $387.1bn. In contrast, the US current account deficit was $462bn in 2017, bigger only than Britain’s $91.4bn. The deficit was 2.5% of GDP in the first quarter, up from 2.4% in the fourth quarter. Bush warned that the US would “neither forgive nor forget” if France continued to oppose the war on Iraq. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld accused Austria of blocking US troop movements from Germany to Italy and said the US was considering bringing home 100,000 troops stationed in Europe (70,000 in Germany) or relocating them to Eastern Europe. He threatened sanctions for “one reason only: to harm the German economy”. At the time, the US controlled 31.5% of world output to the EU’s 26%. However in 2004 ten additional countries were scheduled to join the 15 EU member states, a combination that would match the size of the US’s economy and exceed its population. FRFI – one of the few left-wing publications in Britain to anticipate the potential for conflict between the US and EU – reported in 2003 that total EU FDI already amounted to 52.5% of the world total, nearly 2.5 times that of the US. Over the period 1980-2001, the US share of the global total has halved. The massive rise in the US’s military spending has been necessitated by the need to reverse the decline of its economic dominance – to reiterate, if it doesn’t reverse this it won’t be able to valorise its capital. The Department of Defense’s base budget grew by 31% between 2000 and 2014. An $82bn hike to $716bn in 2018 represented an increase that by itself was larger than the entire defence budget of every country on earth, save China. Trump called the Defense Department’s annual budget “crazy” and proposed a 5% cut, but then committed to a $750bn budget for 2019. Who is really in charge? US military spending is at least 10 times the size of Russia’s, and four times the size of China’s. This is the same Department of Defense with a serious existing accounting problem. In 2016, before Trump was elected, the department’s Inspector General said he could not properly track $6.5 trillion in defence spending. An academic study looking at the years 1998-2015 later put the figure at $21 trillion. Clearly this is unsustainable. As Engels says, “the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on production in general”. US manufacturing output in the 1960s, at the time of the Vietnam War, constituted 27% of the economy and provided 24% of employment. In 2003 manufacturing amounted to 13.8% of its GDP, falling to 12.5% in 2015, and 10.5% of employment, falling to 8.8% in 2013. The US industrial base is shrinking and with it the manufacturing and engineering capacity to achieve military domination of the world. In November 2004 Le Monde Diplomatique reported that, “Some new (EU) states are large arms producers and exporters. The EU is now home to more than 400 companies in 23 countries manufacturing small arms and light weapons – hardly less than the US.” China’s manufacturing sector is now almost as large as those of the US, Japan and Germany combined. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003 its military expenditure was almost $400bn; Iraq’s was $1.4bn, 0.35% of the US’s. In violation of the Iraqi constitution and international law the US-UK Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) “laid off hundreds of thousands of Iraqi workers, virtually eliminated trade tariffs and enacted laws that radically alter Iraq’s economy. Order 39, decreed by CPA head Paul Bremer on September 20 2003, abolished Iraq's ban on foreign investment, allowing foreigners to own up to 100% of all sectors except natural resources. Over 200 state-owned enterprises, including electricity, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals have been privatised. Iraq's highest tax rate has been lowered from 45% to a flat rate of 15%. Although foreign ownership of land remains illegal, companies or individuals will be allowed to lease properties for up to 40 years.” The extraction of Iraq’s oil was also illegal. In 2011 government documents leaked to The Independent revealed that in November 2002, five months before the invasion, the UK Foreign Office invited BP to talks about opportunities in Iraq “post regime change”. Labour’s Baroness Symons, the then Trade Minister, promised BP that she would lobby the Bush administration because the oil giant feared it was being “locked out” of deals that Washington was quietly negotiating with the French and Russian governments and their energy firms. Control over territory, oil and oil transhipment routes is of paramount importance. With around 60% of the world’s oil reserves, the Middle East has been the key battleground. But this rivalry is playing out all over the world, in South America, Asia, Africa and, since the fall of the USSR, central and eastern Europe, which was identified by the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 as “a stable and promising region for FDI”. China, whose contribution to global GDP was expected to eclipse that of the US in 2018, is a particular concern to the traditional powers because its strategy of offering low- or even interest-free loans in exchange for fixed-price sales of primary commodities makes it a more attractive business partner to underdeveloped countries who have been bled dry by high interest loans from the IMF. The US only has intimidation and force left to offer in response. In 2008, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reached a deal with China for roads, railways, clinics, hospitals, schools and two new universities worth $6bn. In exchange, China was given the right to extract 12 million tonnes of copper and cobalt over 25 years. In 2004, when Angola was reluctant to accept the terms of an IMF loan, China stepped in with a no-strings-attached $2bn. An Angolan minister said relations with China “not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it forced the West to treat us with more respect”. China has overtaken Britain, France and the US as a trading partner with Africa. In 2017, China’s trade with Africa was worth $170bn, four-times larger than US-Africa trade. China invested $125bn in Africa in the decade to 2016 and committed to $60bn more over the next three years. In 2017 China’s trade with Latin America reached $244bn, again exceeding that of the US. China’s dominance in manufacturing has forced Latin American countries to deindustrialise somewhat and focus on producing primary commodities; but China’s investments have also had the effect of strengthening their currencies relative to the dollar. In July 2016, the RAND Corporation think tank warned that, whereas the US would have been capable of achieving a quick and decisive victory with minimal losses in a war with China in 2015, China’s improving anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities meant that a war in 2025 would instead be “prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive”. The earlier part of that prediction seemed optimistic, given that the US became bogged down in the face of resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan for years when it expected quick, decisive victories in both, against forces inferior to China’s. Indeed, in March 2019 a RAND analyst said that its war game simulations showed that “when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it”. He said it would cost an extra $24bn a year to turn things around. Chinese and Russian opposition to US deployments of anti-missile systems in Asia has resulted in their greater military cooperation. However, Russia is using its position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to try and contain Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia, where it has regional ambitions of its own. As Trevor Rayne wrote in FRFI: “The US turns to alliances with Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia to confront China, but China offers them investments and better trade deals. If it has to the US ruling class will resort to military force to prevent China ejecting it from its dominant position in the world. Competition between the imperialist powers may be limited to geopolitical manoeuvring, ideological and cyber warfare and negotiation table diplomacy for now, but that cannot last forever. At some point the capitalist crisis will become so deep that the imperialist powers will be forced into direct confrontation with each other. The overaccumulation of capital will have become so great that the only way to sufficiently devalue capital and labour power will be through global conflagration. This tendency expresses itself in increasing competition between the imperialist powers as they vie to attain dominance – that is, to apportion losses to one another, to seize each other’s capital and resources by any means. This is what happened in the 20th century. Two world wars, the Great Depression and fascism were the counter-tendencies and crisis measures required over a span of 41 years to keep the accumulation process going and eventually revive it to a healthy enough level to restore political stability. Kautsky – because he believed accumulation was harmonious – claimed that absolute capitalist breakdown would be brought about inevitably by world war, which in his view would happen only because of uncivilised ruling classes.[513] On the other side of the same coin, Bukharin and Varga believed the Second World War would bring about the completion of the world revolution. This perhaps partly explains some of the controversial decisions taken by the Communist International after 1929, when it effectively ordered its national sections in Europe to take social democratic routes to socialism.[514] Grossman says: “It would be useless to search Bukharin for any other cause of the breakdown of capitalism than the ravages created by war.... If like Bukharin, we expect the breakdown of capitalism to flow from a second round of imperialist wars, then it is necessary to point out that wars are not peculiar to the imperialist stage of capitalism. They stem from the essence of capitalism as such, during all its stages, and have been a constant symptom of capital since its historical inception.... far from being a threat to capitalism, wars are a means of prolonging the existence of the capitalist system as a whole.” Grossman was at pains to show that Kautsky’s was a subjective analysis and that the opposite was true: that massive overaccumulation brought about a systemic breakdown and world war followed necessarily because it was the only way to sufficiently devalue capital, to “ward off imminent collapse” and “create a breathing space” for accumulation to restart. Grossman cites the figure from Wladimir Woytinsky’s 1925 book The World In Numbers that “around 35% of the wealth of mankind was destroyed and squandered in the four years” of the First World War, which had been preceded by a worldwide Long Depression – like the one we’re experiencing now – a series of economic ‘panics’ in the US, and intensifying inter-imperialist rivalries over trade routes and colonial territories. By the end of the war, says Grossman, the mass of living labour “confronted a reduced capital, and this created new scope for accumulation”. And yet it wasn’t enough – the 1929 Wall Street Crash followed, “a continuation of the unresolved economic crisis preceding World War One”, as Mattick says.[519] The New Deal attempted to resolve the crisis in the US and fascism attempted to resolve it in Germany (the equivalent of a New Deal in Germany through the SPD’s reforms having already failed before 1929). Neither worked. It would take an even more destructive global war to end the depression. This after Kautsky had claimed in 1927 that capitalism stood, “from a purely economic point of view, stronger than ever”.[520] The First World War – “legalised slaughter” in the apt words of Harry Patch, the last surviving combat soldier of that war from any country – killed 37 million people. The Second World War killed between 70 million and 85 million, 3% of the 1940 world population of an estimated 2.3 billion. The equivalent today from a world population of 7.53 billion would be 226 million. But given that today’s total accumulation and overaccumulation are considerably greater than before World War Two, it follows that it would take a considerably greater level of destruction to – again, temporarily – resolve the crisis. Given that and the fact that every major war following economic breakdown is decided only by total war (the US Civil War, the Peninsular War and the Crimean War being other prime examples), it could be argued that the amount of destruction required is so high now that today’s deepening crisis may at some point necessitate nothing short of a nuclear exchange between the imperialist powers. The Second World War ended with the US dropping the A-bomb on Japan, after all. If World War Three was not sufficiently destructive, then a bigger crisis would follow necessitating World War Four, just as World War Two followed World War One. And of course a Fourth World War would be necessitated at some point anyway. This is all assuming that the crisis that preceded a World War Three wasn’t the final breakdown, the absolute historical limit of capital accumulation. If it were then no amount of destruction could save capitalism. As we said earlier, this is surely now the case – there can be no 1945 productivity boom that breathes another century of life into the system, for automation has already all but abolished the law of value. The current arms race is in fact already accelerating the development of automation and therefore the rate of profit’s historical fall towards zero. We therefore assert that – aside from the fact that a world war today would end life on Earth and destroy the climate for good – even a world war cannot save capitalism this time. Rather than trying to destroy itself in order to renew itself this time, capitalism is now preparing to either destroy or wind itself up for good. Trade wars will continue to intensify. Protectionism becomes an increasingly inevitable reflex as nations attempt to defend domestic and overseas assets; combined with stagnant productivity, this tends to manifest politically in a parochial, ‘anti-globalisation’ nationalism, ie right-wing populism or proto-fascism, as capitalists which rely more on the domestic market – determining their conservatism – finally gain the upper-hand over the more liberal exporting sectors, only to deepen the overall economic crisis by making trade increasingly expensive and centralising capital into yet fewer hands. As Michael Pettis wrote in the FT in 2009, the fact that “nearly everyone agrees that a world that retreats into direct and indirect forms of trade protection is a world that is worse off... should not allay our worries. In the 1930s, it was also well understood that the crisis would be exacerbated by plunging international trade. This did not stop a descent into the protectionism which put the ‘Great’ into the Great Depression.” In February 2019, a senior European Commission economist warned that a Third World War is an increasingly “high probability” due to the “disintegration of global capitalism”.[523] Professor Hanappi, Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration , noted that the emerging trade wars, massive growth of military spending and return of ‘populism’ bear unnerving similarities with trends that beset the world before the outbreak of the first two world wars. Marx wrote that as soon as capital feels itself threatened it will “seek refuge in other forms”, which appear to perfect its rule as capital “through curbs on free competition”; although the curbs on competition “appear to complete the mastery of capital, they are at the same time, by curbing free competition, the heralds of its dissolution, and of the dissolution of the mode of production based on it”.[524] This applies to both the monopolistic stage of capitalism and the inevitability of protectionism. As mentioned, in 2015-16, the G20 economies introduced a record number of trade-restrictive measures. Globalisation was in retreat before Brexit and Trump, because its ability to expand capital is increasingly exhausted. Just as protectionism and trade wars were precursors of the first two world wars, Brexit and Trump’s trade wars threaten to be precursors of a Third World War. Just as the first two world wars were fought between the biggest imperialist rivals, so would a third. That would mean a conflict between the US and its strongest competitor, the German-led EU. On 6 November 2018 France President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army” so that the EU could defend itself from “China, Russia and even the United States of America”, adding: “When I see President Trump announcing that he’s quitting a major disarmament treaty[525] which was formed after the 1980s Euro-missile crisis that hit Europe, who is the main victim? Europe and its security.” Germany already provides the most troops for the UN’s so-called peacekeeping missions. Building on the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO) agreement – which allows co-operation on joint military projects for 25 EU member states, established through the Lisbon Treaty in December 2017 – the European Commission provisionally agreed the founding of a €13bn European Defence Fund (EDF) in February. This is to allow joint R&D projects for European companies. Though no formal agreement is to come into effect until November 2019, it is already known that the fund will exclude both post-Brexit Britain and the US. In response the US complained that the moves undermine the NATO alliance and threatened sanctions on EU firms if either project goes ahead. The EU told the the US not to concern itself with Europe's defence plans. In December 2019 Macron said NATO was already “brain dead”, because “you have no co-ordination of decision-making whatsoever between the US and its NATO allies”. In reality, Europe is still reliant upon the US in military matters, a point made clear by, for example, the dominance of US firms in international contracts or the US’s role in NATO. Accordingly, the EU is, to some degree, split upon the US’s INF withdrawal, with key US allies Britain and Poland offering their unwavering support for the move. While disagreement in Europe over the Treaty itself is small, this reflects broader splits within the EU imperialist bloc, more evident in regard to trade and inter-European political discussions. More significantly in military terms, the US’s dominance over Europe’s military capacity means that Europe requires both time and new alliances if it is to stand on its own feet. Europe is now waking up to this. In July, Macron announced that France would build “a large space command within the Air Force, which will eventually become the Air and Space Force... to better protect our satellites, including in an active way”. Analysts called the move a switch from a defensive to an offensive posture. Macron's proposal follows similar moves by the US, China and Russia in recent years. In 2018, Trump ordered the formation of a sixth branch of the US’s armed forces – a "space force”. Europe's imperialists may have once hoped that the end of Trump's Presidency could see a reconciliation with the US bourgeoisie on more advantageous terms, but such hopes seem to be nothing but a fantasy. On 13 November 2018, a bipartisan panel for the US Congress issued a report stating its approval of the Trump administration's pursuit of “great power competition”. In March 2019, Nicole Gibson, Deputy Director of the US State Department’s office for Europe, warned that European companies would “risk significant sanctions” if they resume laying pipe for the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany. Construction work was suspended in the December because of winter weather. The deal has infuriated the US because it undermines the potential for its energy giants to export surplus shale gas to Europe as liquified natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, US clients in central Europe are also set to lose out. Snaking under the Baltic Sea, NS2 replaces an older pipeline, stripping Ukraine of gas transit fees worth $2.5bn a year, 4% of its GDP. Ukraine president Petro Poroshenko[526] fears NS2 would allow Russia to switch off gas to Ukraine and Central Europe to blackmail its nearer neighbours without disrupting supplies to Western Europe, enabling the Kremlin to exert greater political influence. Russia supplies more than one-third of the natural gas Europe uses, a figure that is expected to reach nearly 50% in the next decade. German businesses say NS2 will slash their energy costs. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that “geostrategically, Europe cannot have an interest in cutting off all relations with Russia”. In 2017 she said that “the times in which we could completely depend on [the US and Britain] are, to a certain extent, over. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” With the relative decline of the US and Britain’s pending departure from the EU, Germany either sees an opportunity to become dominant or the need to find more reliable allies. It may see an alliance with Russia as an extension of European imperialism, and as a replacement for Britain, which itself has reportedly sought to spread misinformation in Europe in an attempt to weaken relations between Germany and Russia.[527] Turkey too, a long time client state of the US, appears to be forming a new alliance with Russia and Germany. In June 2019, the EU and Russia started talks on transitioning to using the rouble and euro in bilateral payments instead of the US dollar. China and Turkey are also investing heavily in the euro. The US is gradually being isolated and the grip on the world economy that the dollar as the world currency anchor gives the US is slipping. In the same week, it emerged that the US had been stepping up its ability to wage a cyberwar on Russia’s power grid, something it had deployed against Venezuela several times, depriving hospitals, factories and residential areas of electricity, earlier in the year. These cyber attacks are acts of war by the US’s own definition. A similar situation is developing with regards to Iran.[528] When Trump pulled the US out of the 2013 Iran nuclear deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from sanctions, Germany, France and even, to the chagrin of the US, Britain – all desperate for outlets for profitable investment – denounced the move and vowed to find ways to circumvent the US ban on trading with Iran, which applies to third parties. In July Russia expressed interest in the EU’s proposed Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism, backing Iran’s demand that it would have to include the oil trade. Significantly, this would see the EU violating US sanctions on two fronts. Trump claims he is trying to stop a nuclear arms race in the Middle East but he is really motivated by competition. In March 2019, Miguel Berger, the Director-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development at Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, complained that, while everyone else was banned from trading with Iran, US trade with Iran in 2018 had in fact doubled. The US says it wants a new deal that curbs Iran’s ballistic missile programme and ends Iran’s supposed influence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the latter in which it is accused of backing the anti-imperialist Houthi movement. But it also wants to control Iran’s oil. The US’s increasingly belligerent client-states Israel and Saudi Arabia see Iran as a threat to their regional dominance and welcomed Trump’s move. [529] In May 2019 Trump warned Iran of “severe consequences” as the US, joined by Britain, began to build up naval and air power in the Persian Gulf. Fears of military conflict grew after Trump blamed Iran for Houthi attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman. While Britain – which, in a blatant act of piracy at the request of the US, later seized an Iranian oil tanker bound for Syria – sided with the US, the EU demanded an independent inquiry. Japan, which had a tanker involved in the controversy, also questioned the veracity of the US’s account. The same week, Iran shot down a US drone. Trump claimed that he called off a retaliatory airstrike at the last minute, instead imposing further suffocating sanctions and launching a cyberattack on Iran’s defence infrastructure. Sanctions have resulted in inflation in Iran of 40% and the IMF predicted a 6% contraction in its economy. Iran said it would have to develop its uranium enrichment levels if Europe did not do more shield Iran from sanctions.[530] Iran could be the spark that ignites conflict between the US and Europe.[531] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s US-UK-backed war on Yemen has resulted, after four years, in what the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis; and rising tensions between India and Pakistan at the beginning of 2019 threaten to spill over into a full-scale war, with the US generally backing the former and China the latter. Pakistan has taken out billions of dollars in loans from China in recent years as part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious trade and infrastructure network connecting China to Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and other regions. China has pledged to provide economic assistance to Pakistan, which has been bailed out by high- interest IMF loans some 14 times since 1980. The task of communists As we have said, Leninists have long predicted that these deepening splits would emerge. They have been proven correct, and the defeatist pseudo-Marxist theories of ‘ultra-imperialism’ – that the imperialist powers in fact form an unshakeable alliance – have been proven wrong. Existing divisions in NATO have been widening since the election of Trump, who has been unsurprisingly delighted by Brexit and its destabilising effect on the EU. Denouncing the EU’s “treatment” of Britain in the negotiations, Trump said at the start of April 2019 that “the EU is likewise a brutal trading partner with the US, which will change”. On 9 April he said the US planned to impose tariffs of $11bn (£8.4bn) on EU goods, partly because “EU subsidies to Airbus have adversely impacted the US”.[532] He must have known what was coming: on 10 April the EU and China announced a very significant trade deal in which they vowed, in a thinly veiled rebuke to the US, “to fight against unilateralism and protectionism”. China and Germany are now engaged in concrete military co-operation, with China deploying armoured vehicles on German soil for joint drills on 11 July, something that has been unthinkable until now.[533] At the same time, the potential for realignment with the US is also contained within the German approach. For example, the nation is considering sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait, escalating tensions with China and easing them with the US. As Trump is so fond of saying, “all options are on the table”. France has vowed to retaliate tit-for-tat against US sanctions. In Tony Kennedy’s foreword to the abridged 1992 English reprint of Grossman’s book, he says: “For Grossman, re-presenting Marx’s theory was no mere academic exercise. Nor was he concerned merely with describing tendencies towards periodic economic crises, of a more or less restricted character, nor even with trends towards more systematic and global recessions. He aimed to show that the essence of Marx’s analysis of capitalist society was the identification of the inexorable tendency towards breakdown as the fundamental characteristic of the social system as a whole.... Grossman contended that the socialist movement’s commitment to the overthrow of capitalism required theoretical proof of the system’s tendency towards breakdown.” This is now the task facing communists today. The first appeal that the Communist International made in 1920 to the international working class was to “Remember the imperialist war!”, warning that the repetition of such destructive wars, when the workers of different countries are coerced by the ruling classes to “cut each other’s throats” is not only possible but inevitable if capitalism is not overthrown.[536] The First World War confirmed what was written in the statutes of the First International, that the emancipation of the working class is not a local, nor a national, but an international question. And given that national bourgeoisies are inevitably pitted against each other in a world war, it follows that the only class that is capable of solidarity internationally is the working class. Nation-states will either respond to the looming crash as it deepens by cutting military expenditure drastically or waging war in a bid to offset economic losses – or perhaps by doing both. We are being haunted by the failure to turn the breakdowns that precipitated the first two world wars into the world revolution that Lenin expected to follow on the heels of the one he led in Russia. Only world socialism can ensure humanity’s survival.

#### **Capitalist crises fuel the rise of fascism---hypernationalism greatly increases the odds of conflict**

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In the broader picture, fascism, whether in its 20th- or 21st-century variant, is a particular, far right response to capitalist crisis, such as that of the 1930s and the one that began with the financial meltdown of 2008 and has now been greatly intensified by the pandemic. Trumpism in the United States; Brexit in the United Kingdom; the increasing influence of neo-fascist and authoritarian parties and movements throughout Europe (including Poland, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Belgium and Greece), and around the world (such as in Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil and India), represent just such a far-right response to the crisis. Trumpism and Fascism The telltale signs of the fascist threat in the United States are in plain sight. Fascist movements expanded rapidly since the turn of the century in civil society and in the political system through the right wing of the Republican Party. Trump proved to be a charismatic figure able to galvanize and embolden disparate neo-fascist forces, from white supremacists, white nationalists, militia, neo-Nazis and Klansmen, to the Oath Keepers, the Patriot Movement, Christian fundamentalists, and anti-immigrant vigilante groups. Since 2016, numerous other groups have emerged, from the Proud Boys and QAnon to the Boogaloo movement (whose explicit goal is to spark a civil war) and the terrorist Michigan group known as Wolverine Watchmen. They are heavily armed and mobilizing for confrontation in near-perfect consort with the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, which long since has captured that party and turned it into one of utter reaction. Encouraged by Trump’s imperial bravado, his populist and nationalist rhetoric, and his openly racist discourse, predicated in part on whipping up anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Black sentiment, they began to cross-pollinate to a degree not seen in decades as they gained a toehold in the Trump White House and in state and local governments around the country. Paramilitarism spread within many of these organizations and overlapped with state repressive agencies. Racist, far right and fascist militia, identified by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat, [operate inside law enforcement agencies](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law). As far back as 2006, a [government intelligence assessment](http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf) had warned of “white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement by organized groups and by self-initiated infiltration by law enforcement personnel sympathetic to white supremacist causes.” The fascist insurgency reached a feverish pitch in the wake of the mass protests sparked by the police-perpetrated murder of George Floyd in May. Among recent incidents too numerous to list, fascist militia members have routinely showed up heavily armed at anti-racist rallies to threaten protesters, and in several instances, have carried out assassinations. Trump has refused to condemn the armed right-wing insurgency. To the contrary, he [defended a self-described vigilante and “Blue Lives Matter” enthusiast](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/08/31/908137377/trump-defends-kenosha-shooting-suspect) who shot to death two unarmed protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 25. On September 3, federal marshals carried out an extra-judicial execution of [Michael Reinoehl](https://truthout.org/articles/trump-appears-to-admit-extrajudicial-killing-of-michael-reinoehl-was-planned/), who admitted to shooting a few days earlier a member of the white supremacist group Patriot Prayer during a confrontation between Trump supporters and counterprotesters in Portland, Oregon. “There has to be [retribution](https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21436216/trump-michael-reinoehl-protests-portland-shooting),” declared Trump in a chilling interview in which he seemed to take credit for what amounted to a death squad execution. Particularly ominous was the plot by a domestic terrorist militia group, broken up on October 8, to storm the Michigan state capitol to kidnap and possibly kill the Democratic governor of Michigan and other officials, a conspiracy that the White House refused to condemn. While there are great differences between [20th- and 21st-century fascism](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf) and any parallels should not be exaggerated, we would do well to recall the 1923 [“beer hall putsch”](https://www.britannica.com/event/Beer-Hall-Putsch/The-Munich-Putsch) in Bavaria, Germany, which marked a turning point in the Nazis’ rise to power. In that incident, Hitler and a heavily armed group of his followers hatched a plot to kidnap leaders of the Bavarian government. Loyal government officials put down the putsch and jailed Hitler but the fascist insurgency expanded in its aftermath. The fascist putsch now hinges on the November election. The rule of law is breaking down. Trump has claimed, without any credible evidence, that the vote will be fraudulent, has refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, and has all but called on his supporters to be prepared for an insurrection. Himself a [transnational capitalist](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/TheTransnationalCapitalistClass.pdf), a racist and a fascist, Trump took advantage of the protests over the murder of George Floyd to bring the project to a new level, inciting from the White House itself the fascist mobilization in U.S. civil society, manipulating fear and a racist backlash with his “law and order” discourse, and threatening a qualitative escalation of the police state. Widespread and systematic voter suppression, especially of those from marginalized communities, has already [disenfranchised](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/07/americans-voting-rights-disenfranchisement) millions. Donald Trump Jr. [called in September for](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-jr-video-2020-election-ballot-fraud-b605186.html) “every able-bodied man and woman to join an army for Trump’s election security operation.” Morphology of the Fascist Project The current crisis of global capitalism is both structural and political. Politically, capitalist states face spiraling crises of legitimacy after decades of hardship and social decay wrought by neoliberalism, aggravated now by these states’ inability to manage the health emergency and the economic collapse. The level of global social polarization and [inequality is unprecedented](https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf). The richest 1 percent of humanity control more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent of this wealth. Such extreme inequalities can only be sustained by extreme levels of state and private violence that lend themselves to fascist political projects. Structurally, the global economy is mired in a crisis of overaccumulation, or chronic stagnation, made much worse by the pandemic. As inequalities escalate, the system churns out more and more wealth that the mass of working people cannot actually consume. As a result, the global market cannot absorb the output of the global economy. The transnational capitalist class cannot find outlets to “unload” the trillions of dollars it has accumulated. In recent years, it has turned to mind-boggling levels of financial speculation, to the raiding and sacking of public budgets, and to militarized accumulation or accumulation by repression. This refers to how accumulation of capital comes increasingly to rely on transnational systems of social control, repression and warfare, as [the global police state](https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341644/the-global-police-state/) expands to defend the global war economy from rebellions from below. Fascism seeks to rescue capitalism from this organic crisis; that is, to violently restore capital accumulation, establish new forms of state legitimacy and suppress threats from below unencumbered by democratic constraints. The project involves a fusion of repressive and reactionary state power with a fascist mobilization in civil society. Twenty-first-century fascism, like its 20th-century predecessor, is a violently toxic mix of reactionary nationalism and racism. Its discursive and ideological repertoire involves extreme nationalism and the promise of national regeneration, xenophobia, doctrines of race/culture supremacy alongside a violent racist mobilization, martial masculinity, militarization of civic and political life, and the normalization — even glorification — of war, social violence and domination. As with its 20th-century predecessor, the 21st-century fascist project hinges on the psychosocial mechanism of dispersing mass fear and anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis toward scapegoated communities, whether Jews in Nazi Germany, immigrants in the United States, or Muslims and lower castes in India, and also on to an external enemy, such as communism during the Cold War, or China and Russia currently. It seeks to organize a mass social base with the promise to restore stability and security to those destabilized by capitalist crises. Fascist organizers appeal to the same social base of those millions who have been devastated by neoliberal austerity, impoverishment, precarious employment and relegation to the ranks of surplus labor, all greatly aggravated by the pandemic. As popular discontent has spread, far right and neo-fascist mobilization play a critical role in the effort by dominant groups to channel this discontent away from a critique of global capitalism and toward support for the transnational capitalist class agenda dressed in populist rhetoric. The fascist appeal is directed in particular to historically privileged sectors of the global working class, such as white workers in the Global North and urban middle layers in the Global South, that are experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility and socioeconomic destabilization. The flip side of targeting certain disaffected sectors is the violent control and suppression of other sectors — which, in the United States, come disproportionately from the ranks of surplus labor, communities that face racial and ethnic oppression, or religious and other forms of persecution. The mechanisms of coercive exclusion include mass incarceration and the spread of prison-industrial complexes; anti-immigrant legislation and deportation regimes; the manipulation of space in new ways so that both gated communities and ghettos are controlled by armies of private security guards and technologically advanced surveillance systems; ubiquitous, often paramilitarized policing; “non-lethal” crowd control methods; and mobilization of the culture industries and state ideological apparatuses to dehumanize victims of global capitalism as dangerous, depraved and culturally degenerate. Racism and Competing Interpretations of the Crisis We cannot under-emphasize the role of racism for the fascist mobilization in the United States. But we need to deepen our analysis of it. The U.S. political system and the dominant groups face a crisis of hegemony and legitimacy. This has involved the breakdown of the white racist historic bloc that to one extent or another reigned supreme from the end of post-Civil War reconstruction to the late 20th century but has become destabilized through capitalist globalization. The far right and neo-fascists are attempting to reconstruct such a bloc, in which “national” identity becomes “white identity” as a stand-in (that is, a code) for a racist mobilization against perceived sources of anxiety and insecurity. Yet many white members of the working class have been experiencing social and economic destabilization, downward mobility, heightened insecurity, an uncertain future and accelerated precariatization — that is, ever more precarious work and life conditions. This sector has historically enjoyed the ethnic-racial privileges that come from white supremacy vis-à-vis other sectors of the working class, but it has been losing these privileges in the face of capitalist globalization. The escalation of veiled and also openly racist discourse from above is aimed at ushering the members of this white working-class sector into a racist and a neo-fascist understanding of their condition. Racism and the appeal to fascism offer workers from the dominant racial or ethnic group an imaginary solution to real contradictions; recognition of the existence of suffering and oppression, even though its solution is a false one. The parties and movements associated with such projects have put forth a racist discourse, less coded and less mediated than that of mainstream politicians, targeting the racially oppressed, ethnic or religious minorities, immigrants and refugees in particular as scapegoats. Yet in this age of globalized capitalism, there is little possibility in the United States or elsewhere of providing such benefits, so that the “wages of fascism” now appear to be entirely psychological. The ideology of 21st-century fascism rests on irrationality — a promise to deliver security and restore stability that is emotive, not rational. It is a project that does not and need not distinguish between the truth and the lie. The Trump regime’s public discourse of populism and nationalism, for example, bears no relation to its actual policies. Trumponomics involves a sweeping deregulation of capital, slashing social spending, dismantling what remains of the welfare state, privatization, tax breaks to corporations and the rich, anti-worker laws, and an expansion of state subsidies to capital — in short, radical neoliberalism. Trump’s populism has no policy substance. It is almost entirely symbolic — hence the significance of his fanatical “build the wall” and similar rhetoric, symbolically essential to sustain a social base for which the state can provide little or no material bribe. This also helps to explain the increasing desperation in Trump’s bravado as the election approaches. But here is the clincher: Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and rising insecurity do not automatically lead to racist or fascist backlash. A racist/fascist interpretation of these conditions must be mediated by political agents and state agencies. Trumpism represents just such a mediation. To beat back the threat of fascism, popular resistance forces must put forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, involving a social justice agenda founded on a working-class politics that can win over the would-be social base of fascism. This would-be base is made up of a majority of workers who are experiencing the same deleterious effects of global capitalism in crisis as the entire working class. We need a social justice and working-class agenda to respond to its increasingly immiserated condition, lest we leave it susceptible to a far right populist manipulation of this condition. Joe Biden may well win the election. Yet even if he does so and manages to take office, the crisis of global capitalism and the fascist project it is stoking will continue. A united front against fascism must be based on a social justice agenda that targets capitalism and its crisis.

### 1AC---Innovation

#### Advantage 2 is Innovation:

#### **DPS unleashes faster and better aligned innovation than either capitalism or state socialism**

Kotz 2 - economics professor at Amherst (David, <https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/Soc_and_Innovation_02.pdf>, emuse) \*DPPS = DPS

3. Capitalist Innovation Mainstream Western economics gives capitalism high marks for innovation. The pursuit of profit is supposed to assure a strong incentive to engage in the invention, development, and production stages of innovation, while also inducing investors to provide potential innovators with the necessary financial means. Free entry into markets compels rapid diffusion of innovations. An optimal contribution to human welfare is assured, given the assumption that profitability reflects the ultimate value to society of any economic activity. While capitalism does promote a certain kind of rapid technological change, the above account has serious flaws. The pursuit of profit does not play such a big role at the important invention stage of innovation. Studies show that a large majority of economically important inventions come from university scientists, government researchers, and independent inventors, for whom pecuniary considerations are not typically dominant.6 At the development stage, the still-high risks, plus the sometimes substantial external (and hence uncapturable) benefits from innovation, lead to (successful) demands for government subsidization.7 The profit incentive for innovation is profoundly contradictory. For the profit incentive to operate, innovators must be able to gain monopoly control over the innovation and bar competitors, or else the first innovator’s profit will be small and fleeting. However, the legal and extra-legal means that capitalist innovators use to gain such monopoly power (patents and predatory tactics) prevent the rapid diffusion of new products and processes. The greatest flaw in the capitalist innovation process has to do with the third question, that of the contribution of innovative activity to human welfare. As capitalist innovators follow the guide of profits, the following problems arise: 1) innovations are disproportionally directed at upper income consumers;8 2) public goods are largely ignored in the innovation process; 3) external benefits and costs of innovation, which may loom very large, are not taken into account in innovation decisions; 4) the monopoly power required to stimulate innovation leads to high monopoly prices for the resulting product, limiting the use of the new innovation and hence reducing the benefit from it;9 5) much innovation activity is pure waste, as firms devote innovation resources toward the end of defeating rivals rather than benefitting consumers.10 While capitalism does promote the development of the forces of production, it does so in a manner that is severely flawed. Capitalism can promote innovation only if the state and other non-capitalist institutions play an active role in organizing and financing the innovation process, particularly the invention stage. It can do so only with significant monopoly power and barriers to entry that simultaneously promote and hinder technical progress. And it produces a severely distorted innovation process that, after a certain stage of development, may subtract as much from human welfare as it contributes, or even more. 4. Innovation under Soviet State Socialism The Soviet system was, at best, a highly flawed and distorted version of socialism. However, it was the first large-scale effort to build a modern economy based on public ownership of productive property and coordination of the economy by economic planning. For this reason, the experience of the Soviet economy in the area of innovation is relevant to our concerns here Spokespeople for the Soviet system claimed that, as a socialist system, it would, and did, outperform capitalism in promoting technical progress. The key advantages cited were the absence of commercial secrecy, the avoidance of the wasteful duplication of R&D effort of capitalism, and the ability to directly incorporate technological advances into the central plan rather than having to rely on the indirect incentive of profitability. However, the Soviet leadership soon discovered that innovation was not as straightforward a process as had been assumed. In the postwar decades the system was frequently adjusted and reformed to improve innovation performance. The mature Soviet system had various institutional components to its innovation system, including the incorporation of major planned new technologies into the central plan by Gosplan each year. However, two institutions were most important in Soviet innovation performance: 1) a system of R&D Institutes, which had innovation as their sole mission; and 2) the individual enterprises, which typically had a design department for new product development and, at larger enterprises, a research laboratory. The Soviet system did have significant strengths in innovation performance.11 Soviet R&D Institutes were staffed with well-trained and dedicated researchers and were reasonably well funded, and they and the enterprises did produce many important innovations. The success was best known in military and space technology, but it extended to some civilian industrial technologies.12 Output per labor hour in the Soviet economy grew rapidly until 1975, much faster than in the U.S. during that period (Kotz and Weir, 1997, p. 46). However, Soviet innovation performance never lived up to expectations. Understanding the problems encountered in the Soviet innovation process -- and the institutional sources of those problems -- is relevant to evaluating the potential innovation performance of a DPPS system, including potential problems that it might encounter. There was a serious incentive problem in the Soviet innovation process. The incentive problem was not located at the R&D Institutes but rather at the enterprises. Soviet enterprises were relatively good at minor innovations. The incentive problem involved larger changes in the production process and the development of new products that differed substantially from what had been produced before. The Soviet enterprise director faced a context of relatively low rewards (in the director’s bonus) for successful innovations while the risks attendant upon major innovations were quite high. This tended to make Soviet enterprise directors conservative about innovation, with reluctance to develop new products or processes or to introduce those that emerged from the R&D Institutes. The risk of innovation was not just the result of the inevitable delays and unforseen costs that arise when trying something new. The key factor was the difficult supply relations in the Soviet planning system. Enterprises always worried about whether sufficient supplies would be delivered on time to enable the enterprise to meet its goals. This was a result of the policy of “taut planning,” aimed at achieving the maximum possible output from available inputs. Innovation necessitates unforeseen changes in required inputs, and the taut planning system made it difficult to change the input mix in mid-plan. The hierarchical relations of Soviet planning meant that enterprises did not have close relations with their suppliers, which compounded the problem. These conditions made innovation very risky, with a likelihood of interruption of the enterprise’s regular production, resulting in financial punishment for the director. Another incentive problem was an absence of penalties for failure to introduce available new technologies. A laggard enterprise with outmoded technology might find its costs rising above the industry average, but the ministry tended to protect its enterprises and made subsidies available. There were also problems of the means available for innovation. Innovations that involve radically new products typically entail either the entry by an existing enterprise into a new line of production or the creation of new enterprises. The Soviet planning system had relatively rigid boundaries between industries, and entry into a different line by an existing enterprise was discouraged, as poaching on the territory of others.13 While new enterprises were created from time to time, this was limited and usually faced opposition from existing enterprises. Individual inventors were greatly underutilized in the Soviet system. Most enterprises had an official policy of making small-scale facilities available to aspiring inventors. However, this program was not very effective at drawing out creative individual inventors, perhaps because the passivity bred into individuals by the repressive, centralized, hierarchical Soviet system discouraged individual inventive activity. In the matter of the effectiveness of innovative activity at advancing human welfare, the Soviet system did avoid some of the problems of capitalist innovation. There was no bias against innovation in public goods. There was no problem of monopoly pricing of new products and processes, with the attendant limitation of their use. However, the Soviet system had significant weaknesses in the effectiveness of innovative activity. We will cite three problems in this area. First, while irrational profit criteria largely guide the allocation of innovative effort in a capitalist system, in the Soviet system the “planners’ preference” guided this allocation. The top leadership favored certain sectors, particularly the military, space exploration, and certain industrial sectors, while consumer goods occupied a lowly place in their priorities. Second, there was a problem stemming from the poor relations between the two key institutions involved in innovation, the R&D Institutes and the enterprises. The R&D Institutes had the best researchers and facilities, and they produced a large volume of plans for new products and processes. However, the enterprises, which had to produce the new product or introduce the new process, complained that plans arrived that were incomplete, unrealistic, or unworkable. R&D Institutes complained that enterprises were uninterested in their proposals. The result was that much innovative effort failed to bear fruit. This seemed to be a result of the hierarchical character of the system, in which relations between institutions at the same level of the hierarchy were very poorly structured.14 Third, and perhaps most serious, innovation in the Soviet system generated major external costs, particularly for workplace and environmental health. The reason for this in the Soviet case was not the pursuit of profit but the single-minded emphasis on growth in output and the undemocratic and repressive character of the system which prevented the affected parties from defending their health interests. 5. Innovation in a Democratic Planned Participatory Socialist System What kind of innovation performance would be expected under a DPPS system, by comparison to that of capitalism and state socialism? Three features of DPPS, as laid out in Devine (1988), are relevant to innovation performance. First, the main features of the overall economic plan would be determined by a democratic process (Devine, 1988, p. 190). Second, the planning and coordination of the economy would take place, not through market forces or top-down central planning, but through a process of “negotiated coordination” (Devine, 1988, ch. 8-10). This means that resource allocation decisions would be made by boards -- industry boards and local and regional negotiated coordination bodies -- that have representation of all affected constituencies, including workers, consumers, suppliers, the local community, and even “cause” groups such as environmentalists, job safety activists, feminists, etc. These bodies would arrive at decisions through compromise among the interests represented on them. In addition, the basic units of social production, or enterprises, are considered social property and have governing boards that include representatives of all groups affected by the activity of the enterprise, including workers, consumers, suppliers, and the local community. Third, each individual would be expected to spend part of her/his work life in each of the main types of labor, which Devine defines as planning and managing labor, creative labor, nurturing labor, skilled labor, and unskilled/repetitive labor (Devine, 1988, 171). This would eliminate the social division of labor, while preserving the technical division of labor with its efficiency advantages In the absence of competitive pursuit of profits, or a Politburo demanding innovation, what would be the source of innovation under DPPS? First, the democratic, participatory institutions of that system would empower the population to demand innovations aimed at its own benefit. Under such a system, people would stand to benefit from innovation, in the three roles that people occupy – that of consumer, worker, and community member. Consumers can benefit from new, better, and cheaper products. Workers can benefit from less arduous toil and a more satisfying experience at work. Members of the community can benefit from products and work processes that improve, rather than harm, community life. DPPS, like every economic system, can also tap a second potential source of innovation. That is the species trait of human beings of having a propensity to look for ways to change and improve their methods of doing things, entirely apart from any desire for more goods or less labor. This drive, present in most people, although not in equal measure in all, represents an important source of innovative behavior at the stage of invention, if the economic system allows it to operate freely. How would a DPPS economy translate the potential benefits of innovation into actual effective innovative activity? How would it encourage, within the economy, the expression of human beings’ natural tendency to create new things? If the populace wants innovation, they would have to build into the system significant incentives for those who are in a position to carry it out. Enterprise managers, along with everyone else who participates in any of the stages of innovation, should be eligible for rewards for successful innovation. It is not sufficient to assume that decision-makers will automatically innovate -- it must be communicated to them, via a reward system, that society values innovation. Such rewards would be needed regardless of the mix of material versus moral incentives. Pay incentives need not be huge to elicit innovative behavior, as long they are large enough to bring a noticeable consumption benefit to the innovator. As the Soviet experience indicates, a planned economy can increase the risk associated with innovation, deterring innovative activity. However, DPPS should not suffer from the problems of uncertain supplies and inflexibility that characterized Soviet planning. With representatives on one another’s decision-making boards and with opportunities to communicate on negotiated coordination bodies, there should be reliable and flexible relations between suppliers and customers. It would be necessary to eschew the Soviet policy of taut planning and operate the economy with sufficient excess productive capacity to accommodate the unforeseen changes in inputs that innovation requires. Without the spur of competition to compel laggard enterprises to adopt the best technology in the industry, could an enterprise management, perhaps backed up by a workforce unenthusiastic about change, simply refuse to make improvements? As was noted above, an enterprise under DPPS is not the sole property of its workers but is social property, upon which constituencies outside the enterprise have a legitimate claim. Industry boards would have to keep track of laggard enterprises, and consumer representatives on both industry and enterprise boards would have to be powerful enough to exert pressure to make appropriate changes, imposing financial penalties where necessary. In order for this system to work effectively, it would be desirable to have more than one enterprise in each industry, except in cases of natural monopoly.15 The purpose is not to impose a market form of competition in which the cheapest producer drives out the rest, a process which often yields socially irrational outcomes. Rather, the purpose is to permit the gathering of comparative information about enterprise performance, from market exchange as well as other sources, so as to make informed decisions about what changes enterprises should be asked to make. It would not always turn out that the higher-cost producer is the one asked to change; the lower-cost producer might be found to have achieved low costs by anti-social practices rather than superior technology. Long ago Adam Smith complained that the detailed division of labor tends to make workers stupid. The DPPS practice of assuring everyone participation in the highest types of labor should have the opposite effect. This practice, along with the widespread participation in decision-making fostered by a DPPS society, should encourage the creative, innovative behavior that is natural to our species. DPPS should create conditions for a substantial outpouring of creativity from the population, some of which would take the form of innovation in the economic sphere. In the matter of assuring adequate means for innovation, DPPS would face a serious problem. The basic institutions of DPPS would not necessarily provide sufficient opportunities for creative individuals to work out new economically relevant ideas. More generally, there would be a danger that the decision-making boards of DPPS would tend to represent existing ways of doing things and offer resistance to innovation. The citizens of a DPPS society could solve this problem by establishing an Innovation Facilitation Board (IFB), dedicated to the promotion of innovation throughout the economy.16 The IFB would be given substantial financing from the central treasury. It would take applications from enterprises, informal groups, or individuals that wanted to work on inventing a new product or process or to engage in the development stage of an innovation. It would be able to make grants covering a long enough time period to provide a chance of success. Determining the membership of the IFB represents a serious problem for DPPS. If the IFB included representatives of all the constituencies that are affected by innovation, this would be likely to subvert its intended function. Major innovations typically have victims, and the potential costs may be more apparent than the potential benefits when the innovation is still at an early stage.17 A simple application of the principle of wide representation might block the development of new products and processes before their potential benefits became apparent. In order to be capable of carrying out its mandate, the IFB would have to be constituted as an independent board, perhaps made up of consumer representatives and experts of various kinds. Such a departure from the usual practice would be consistent with the underlying principle of DPPS, as long as the final decision to implement an innovation rested with a representative board. The IFB would facilitate and encourage the invention and development stages for new products and processes. It seems justified to protect the early stages of innovation from a final social decision, until it has been developed to the point where a well-informed judgment can be made about benefits and costs. However, the decision to implement an innovation should have to pass the test of the system’s core process of evaluation by, and compromise among, all affected constituencies. This calls for a second institution, an Innovation Approval Board (IAB). It would be constituted in the usual way, with representation of all relevant interests. Its role would be to determine whether a proposed new product or process, which emerged from a grant from the IFB, should be given the green light for production/introduction. While contemporary capitalism does place some after-the-fact restraints on socially harmful innovation, through state regulation and individual or class-action lawsuits, DPPS would place social interests at the heart of the innovation process. While the research and development stages of a potentially harmful project could not be readily blocked by opponents, the project could not be implemented, and the costs actually imposed, without social approval. Furthermore, those engaging in invention or development on an IFB grant would know the criteria by which the implementation of the innovation would eventually be judged by the IAB, which should have a positive impact on the direction of invention and development. A remaining problem is the possible need to allow an existing enterprise to enter a new line of production, or to permit the founding of a new enterprise, in order to implement a major innovation. This might encounter resistence from existing interests. To avoid this problem, once the IAB has given its approval, the innovators should have the right to request permission to start a new enterprise, or enlist an existing enterprise to move outside its previous line of work, in order to implement the innovation. A decision to grant such a request might require a joint meeting of the IFB and the IAB. The social effectiveness of innovation under DPPS should be free of each of the five problems of capitalist innovation cited above. Innovation would not be directed disproportionately to satisfy the rich, since there would be no rich class, nor would profits from sale guide innovation. The balance between innovation in public and private goods should reflect the citizenry’s priorities, since representative bodies would allocate innovation resources between the two types of goods, and the incentives for innovation should operate equally for the two. External benefits and costs, including those affecting workers and the environment, should be fully considered by the representative boards that make decisions about the introduction of new technologies and products. Such decisions would not face the pressure to impose costs on third parties that results from competitive profit-seeking. There would be no problem of monopoly pricing restricting the application of innovations and no waste of innovative effort due to oligopolistic competition. The three problems that undermined the effectiveness of innovation under state socialist planning should be absent from DPPS. No Politburo officials would dictate priorities for innovation. Instead, democratic decision-making would determine the amount and allocation of innovation. The waste-generating disconnection between R&D Institutes and enterprises should not be present in DPPS, since horizontal relations among institutions would be strong. If R&D Institutes were designed as part of the innovation system of DPPS, then cross representation between them and the enterprises should permit an effective interface between the two types of institutions. Last, the causes of the severe external costs of innovation under state socialism – a single-minded focus on growth of output and a lack of democracy – should not characterize DPPS. Our conclusion is that the basic defining institutions of DPPS are generally favorable for innovation, but these institutions alone would not be sufficient to guarantee successful innovation performance. By adding the set of additional institutions and policies mentioned above, DPPS should display an innovation performance far superior at meeting human needs to that of either capitalism or state socialism. Of course, such a system would not guarantee that every innovation would contribute to human welfare. It is not always possible to predict in advance what the eventual consequences of a new product or process will be. However, such a system would be far superior to earlier systems at making such decisions.

#### An innovation process centered on social interests is key to avert extinction from black-ball technology

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Achieving stabilization The truth of VWH would be bad news. But it would not imply that civilization will be devastated. In principle at least, there are several responses that could stabilize the world even if vulnerability exists. Recall that we defined the hypothesis in terms of a black-ball technology making civilizational devastation extremely likely conditional on technological development continuing and the semi-anarchic default condition persisting. Thus we can theoretically consider the following possibilities for achieving stabilization: 1. Restrict technological development. 2. Ensure that there does not exist a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. 3. Establish extremely effective preventive policing. 4. Establish effective global governance. We will discuss (3) and (4) in subsequent sections. Here we consider (1) and (2). We will argue they hold only limited promise as ways of protecting against potential civilizational vulnerabilities. Technological relinquishment In its general form, technological relinquishment looks exceedingly unpromising. Recall that we construed the word ‘technology’ broadly; so that completely stopping technological development would require something close to a cessation of inventive activity everywhere in the world. That is hardly realistic; and if it could be done, it would be extremely costly – to the point of constituting an existential catastrophe in its own right (Namely, ‘permanent stagnation’ (Bostrom, 2013)). That general relinquishment of scientific and technological research is a non-starter does not, however, imply that limited curtailments of inventive activities could not be a good idea. It can make sense to forego particularly perilous directions of advancement. For instance, recalling our ‘easy nukes’ scenario, it would be sensible to discourage research into laser isotope separation for uranium enrichment (Kemp, 2012). Any technology that makes it possible to produce weapons-grade fissile material using less energy or with a smaller industrial footprint would erode important barriers to proliferation. It is hard to see how a slight reduction in the price of nuclear energy would compensate. On the contrary, the world would probably be better off if it somehow became harder and more expensive to enrich uranium. What we would ideally want in this area is not technological progress but technological regress. While targeted regress might not be in the cards, we could aim to slow the rate of advancement towards risk-increasing technologies relative to the rate of advancement in protective technologies. This is the idea expressed by the principle of differential technological development. In its original formulation, the principle focuses on existential risk; but we can apply it more broadly to also encompass technologies with ‘merely’ devastational potential: Principle of Differential Technological Development. [slow] the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, especially ones that raise the level of existential risk; and accelerate the development of beneficial technologies, especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other technologies (Bostrom, 2002). The principle of differential technological development is compatible with plausible forms of technological determinism. For example, even if it were ordained that all technologies that can be developed will be developed, it can still matter when they are developed. The order in which they arrive can make an important difference – ideally, protective technologies should come before the destructive technologies against which they protect; or, if that is not possible, then it is desirable that the gap be minimized so that other countermeasures (or luck) may tide us over until robust protection become available. The timing of an invention also influences what sociopolitical context the technology is born into. For example, if we believe that there is a secular trend toward civilization becoming more capable of handling black balls, then we may want to delay the most risky technological developments, or at least abstain from accelerating them. Even if we suppose that civilizational devastation is unavoidable, many would prefer it to take place further into the future, at a time when maybe they and their loved ones are no longer alive anyway.32 Differential technological development doesn’t really make sense in the original urn-of-creativity model, where the color of each ball comes as a complete surprise. If we want to use the urn model in this context, we must modify it. We could stipulate, for example, that the balls have different textures and that there is a correlation between texture and color, so that we get clues about the color of a ball before we extract it. Another way to make the metaphor more realistic is to imagine that there are strings or elastic bands between some of the balls, so that when we pull on one of them we drag along several others to which it is linked. Presumably the urn is highly tubular, since certain technologies must emerge before others can be reached (we are not likely to find a society that uses jet planes and flint axes). The metaphor would also become more realistic if we imagine that there is not just one hand daintily exploring the urn: instead, picture a throng of scuffling prospectors reaching in their arms in hopes of gold and glory, and citations. Correctly implementing differential technological development is clearly a difficult strategic task (Cf. Collingridge, 1980). Nevertheless, for an actor who cares altruistically about long-term outcomes and who is involved in some inventive enterprise (e.g. as a researcher, funder, entrepreneur, regulator, or legislator) it is worth making the attempt. Some implications, at any rate, seem fairly obvious: for instance, don’t work on laser isotope separation, don’t work on bioweapons, and don’t develop forms of geoengineering that would empower random individuals to unilaterally make drastic alterations to the Earth’s climate. Think twice before accelerating enabling technologies – such as DNA synthesis machines – that would directly facilitate such ominous developments.33 But boost technologies that are predominantly protective; for instance, ones that enable more efficient monitoring of disease outbreaks or that make it easier to detect covert WMD programs. Even if it is the case that all possible ‘bad’ technologies are bound to be developed eventually, it can still be helpful to buy a little time.34 However, differential technological development does not on its own offer a solution for vulnerabilities that persist over long periods – ones where adequately protective technologies are much harder to develop than their destructive counterparts, or where destruction has the advantage even at technological maturity.35 Preference modification Another theoretically possible way of achieving civilizational stabilization would be to change the fact that there exists a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. We reserve for later discussion of interventions that would reduce the effective number of independent actors by increasing various forms of coordination. Here we consider the possibility of modifying the distribution of preferences (within a more or less constant population of actors). The degree to which this approach holds promise depends on which type of vulnerability we have in mind. In the case of a Type-1 vulnerability, preference modification does not look promising, at least in the absence of extremely effective means for doing so. Consider that some Type-1 vulnerabilities would result in civilizational devastation if there is even a single empowered person anywhere in the world who is motivated to pursue the destructive outcome. With that kind of vulnerability, reducing the number of people in the apocalyptic residual would do nothing to forestall devastation unless the number could be reduced all the way to zero, which may be completely infeasible. It is true that there are other possible Type-1 vulnerabilities that would require a somewhat larger apocalyptic residual in order for civilizational devastation to occur: for example, in a scenario like ‘easy nukes’, maybe there would have to be somebody from the apocalyptic residual in each of several hundred cities. But this is still a very low bar. It is difficult to imagine an intervention – short of radically re-engineering human nature on a fully global scale – that would sufficiently deplete the apocalyptic residual to entirely eliminate or even greatly reduce the threat of Type-1 vulnerabilities. Note that an intervention that halves the size of the apocalyptic residual would not (at least not through any firstorder effect) reduce the expected risk from Type-1 vulnerabilities by anywhere near as much. A reduction of 5 percent or 10 percent of Type-1 risk from halving the apocalyptic residual would be more plausible. The reason is that there is wide uncertainty about how destructive some new blackball technology would be, and we should arguably use a fairly uniform prior in log space (over several orders of magnitude) over the size of apocalyptic residual that would be required in order for civilizational devastation to occur conditional on a Type-1 vulnerability arising. In other words, conditional on some new technology being developed that makes it easy for an average individual to kill at least one million people, it may be (roughly) as likely that the technology would enable the average individual to kill one million people, ten million people, a hundred million people, a billion people, or every human alive. These considerations notwithstanding, preference modification could be helpful in scenarios in which the set of empowered actors is initially limited to some small definable subpopulation. Some black-ball technologies, when they first emerge from the urn, might be difficult to use and require specialized equipment. There could be a period of several years before such a technology has been perfected to the point where an average individual could master it. During this early period, the set of empowered actors could be quite limited; for example, it might consist exclusively of individuals with bioscience expertise working in a particular type of lab. Closer screening of applicants to positions in such labs could then make a meaningful dent in the risk that a destructive individual gains access to the biotech black ball within the first few years of its emergence.36 And that reprieve may offer an opportunity to introduce other countermeasures to provide more lasting stabilization, in anticipation of the time when the technology gets easy enough to use that it diffuses to a wider population. For Type-2a vulnerabilities, the set of empowered actors is much smaller. Typically what we are dealing with here are states, perhaps alongside a few especially powerful nonstate actors. In some Type-2a scenarios, the set might consist exclusively of two superpowers, or a handful of states with special capabilities (as is currently the case with nuclear weapons). It could thus be very helpful if the preferences of even a few powerful states were shifted in a more peaceloving direction. The ‘safe first strike’ scenario would be a lot less alarming if the actors facing the security dilemma had attitudes towards one another similar to those prevailing between Finland and Sweden. For many plausible sets of incentives that could arise for powerful actors as a consequence of some technological breakthrough, the prospects for a non-devastational outcome would be significantly brightened if the actors in question had more irenic dispositions. Although this seems difficult to achieve, it is not as difficult as persuading almost all the members in the apocalyptic residual to alter their dispositions. Lastly, consider Type-2b. Recall that such a vulnerability entails that ‘by default’ a great many actors face incentives to take some damaging action, such that the combined effects add up to civilizational devastation. The incentives for using the black-ball technology must therefore be ones that have a grip on a substantial fraction of the world population – economic gain being perhaps the prime example of such a near-universal motivation. So imagine some private action, available to almost every individual, which saves each person who takes it a fraction X of his or her annual income, while producing a negative externality such that if half the world’s population takes the action then civilization gets devastated. At X = 0, we can assume that few people would take the antisocial action. But the greater X is, the larger the fraction of the population that would succumb to temptation. Unfortunately, it is plausible that the value of X that would induce at least half of the population to take the action is small, perhaps less than 1 per cent.37 While it would be desirable to change the distribution of global preferences so as to make people more altruistic and raise the value of X, this seems difficult to achieve. (Consider the many strong forces already competing for hearts and minds – corporate advertisers, religious organizations, social movements, education systems, and so on.) Even a dramatic increase in the amount of altruism in the world – corresponding, let us say, to a doubling of X from 1 percent to 2 per cent – would prevent calamity only in a relatively narrow band of scenarios, namely those in which the private benefit of using the destructive technology is in the 1–2 per cent range. Scenarios in which the private gain exceeds 2 per cent would still result in civilizational devastation. In sum, modifying the distribution of preferences within the set of actors that would be destructively empowered by a black-ball discovery could be a useful adjunct to other means of stabilization, but it can be difficult to implement and would at best offer only very partial protection (unless we assume extreme forms of worldwide re-engineering of human nature).38 Some specific countermeasures and their limitations Beside influencing the direction of scientific and technological progress, or altering destruction-related preferences, there are a variety of other possible countermeasures that could mitigate a civilizational vulnerability. For example, one could try to: • prevent the dangerous information from spreading; • restrict access to requisite materials, instruments, and infrastructure; • deter potential evildoers by increasing the chance of their getting caught; • be more cautious and do more risk assessment work; and • establish some kind of surveillance and enforcement mechanism that would make it possible to interdict attempts to carry out a destructive act.

#### Black-ball technology causes extinction

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Full-scale nuclear war. There is roughly 0.02-7% chance per year of accidental full-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia (Barrett, Baum, & Hostetler, 2013). With fairly high probabilities of nuclear winter and civilization collapse given nuclear war, this is order of magnitude 10% this century. We should also take into consideration that despite reductions in nuclear weapons, a new nuclear arms race is possible in the 21st century. Such a race may include more devastating weapons or cheaper manufacturing methods. Nuclear war could include the creation of large cobalt bombs as doomsday weapons or attacks on nuclear power plants. It could also start a chain of events which result in civilization collapse. Nanotechnology risks. Although molecular manufacturing can be achieved without self-replicating machines (Drexler & Phoenix, 2004), technological fascination with biological systems makes it likely that self-replicating machines will be created. Moreover, catastrophic uses of nanotechnology needn’t be due to accident, but also due to the actions of purposeful malignant agents. Therefore, we estimate the chance of runaway self-replicating machines causing “gray goo” and thus human extinction to be one per cent in this century. There could also be extinction risks from weapons produced by safe exponential molecular manufacturing. See also (Turchin, 2016). Artificial pandemic and other risks from synthetic biology. An artificial multipandemic is a situation in which multiple (even hundreds) of individual viruses created through synthetic biology are released simultaneously either by a terrorist state or as a result of the independent activity of biohackers (Turchin, Green, & Dekenbergern, 2017). Because the capacity to create such a multipandemic could arrive as early as within the next ten to thirty years (as all the needed technologies already exist), it could overshadow future risks, like nanotech and AI, so we give it a higher estimate. There are also other possible risks, connected with synthetic biology, which are widely recognized as serious (Bostrom, 2002). Agricultural catastrophe. There is about a one per cent risk per year of a ten per cent global agricultural shortfall occurring due to a large volcanic eruption, a medium asteroid or comet impact, regional nuclear war, abrupt climate change, or extreme weather causing multiple breadbasket failures (Denkenberger 2016). This could lead to 10% mortality. Red AI risks. The risks connected with the possible creation of non-aligned Strong AI are discussed by (Bostrom, 2014), (Yudkowsky, 2008), (Yampolskiy & Fox, 2013) and others. It is widely recognized as the most serious X risk. AI could start an “intelligence explosion wave” through the Universe, which could prevent appearance of the other civilizations before they create their own AI. Purple Something like the Caribbean crisis in the past, but larger size. Currently, there are no known purple risks. If we could be sure that Strong AI will appear in the next 100 years and would probably be negative, it would constitute a purple risk. Another example would be the creation of a Doomsday weapon that could kill our species with global radiation poisoning (much greater ionizing radiation release than all of the current nuclear weapons) (Kahn, 1959). A further example would be a large incoming asteroid being located, or an extinction level pandemic has begun. These situations require quick and urgent effort on all levels.

#### Capitalism locks in existential climate change---only socialism can achieve the absolute decoupling necessary to solve

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, https://grossmanite.medium.com/socialism-or-extinction-is-a-fact-not-a-slogan-3cb97b198c50, emuse)

Socialism or extinction is not just a slogan, though; it is a statement of scientific fact. If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the [sole source of profit](http://gesd.free.fr/kliman99.pdf) — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon and other ‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, probably before the end of the present century. (Capital’s exploitation of labour is therefore also the root cause of [alleged plummeting sperm counts](https://grossmanite.medium.com/declining-sperm-counts-polluted-breast-milk-autoimmune-disorders-the-diabolical-legacy-of-53462aa1245d) (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and damage human cells.) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s ([now existential) economic crisis](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0) — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’, as most leftists seem to put it, that is the central or immediate problem; rather, it is the pace of production and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in (on average) decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — [down from 81% in 2010](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-total-primary-energy-demand-by-fuel-2010-2019) — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, [according to S&P Global Platts Analytics](https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062320-fossil-fuels-energy-mix-infographic-interactive). (Even 1C has already seen a reported [400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes](https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/public_health/Death-toll-from-climate-change-estimated-at-400000-In-2010.html); while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting [70 years sooner than previously expected](https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/canada-permafrost). While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise, since economic output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017… This increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. “There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. The shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. “The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy… To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction… It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe… “Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot — enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. “There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. Under socialism, goods (having been decommodified) are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. Rather than fossil fuel (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) or metals (which are finite), we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially (for physical products) fibrous plants ([especially hemp](https://medium.com/@Grossmanite/the-green-new-deal-is-species-suicide-only-a-hemp-based-industrial-revolution-can-save-earths-f9c3dc29c4e3), which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) and [mycelium](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-mycelium-revolution-is-upon-us/) (from which we can even make [computers](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsfs.2018.0029)). And because socialism can plan and co-ordinate production as a whole on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of capital accumulation and anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp [quickly draw down and sequester CO2](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hemp-and-lots-of-it-could_b_328275?guccounter=1) while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that [outperform lithium and graphene](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-28770876); and highly-insulating [carbon-negative hempcrete](https://www.ukhempcrete.com/services/better-than-zero-carbon-buildings/)) keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation, etc. There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found [huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/deep-life-microbes-underground-bacteria-earth-surface-carbon-observatory-science-study-a8677521.html), despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and [produce electricity in the process](https://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/technologies/18may_wastenot.html). It is now thought that one day [microbial fuel cells](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/ames/could-electricity-producing-bacteria-help-power-future-space-missions/) could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, [smashing the myth of The Individual](https://aeon.co/essays/science-and-metaphysics-must-work-together-to-answer-lifes-deepest-questions) — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production. Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, another industry that only exists on a small scale under capitalism because of the lack of labour exploitation involved. Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is [the safest form of energy production](https://amp.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change). There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if [water can be ‘artificially’ produced](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071031125457.htm)). That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that [will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0)). It would therefore have to be funded by taxes that eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these taxes are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway [becoming an economic necessity](https://fleetworld.co.uk/road-test-hyundai-i30/) for the first time — gives humanity the chance of steering Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

### 1AC---Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector in accordance with Democratically Planned Socialism.

### 1AC---Solvency

#### Solvency:

#### DPS is the optimal economic structure---avoids the challenges that accompanied the Soviet model

Kotz 8 - economics professor at Amherst (David, https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/What\_Ec\_Struc\_Soc\_08\_03.pdf, emuse)

The economic problems of actually existing socialism were not inherent in socialism, or in economic planning. They were structural problems of the particular form of planning that first arose in the Soviet Union and later appeared in other Communist Party ruled states. All of the economic problems listed in section 2 above were due to a key feature of that form of socialism: an absence of popular participation in decision-making in the economy and the state. There were various problematic policies, but the foregoing structural feature was the underlying source of the economic problems.5 Economic activity in any system will serve the needs of those who have power within that system. In a market economy ordinary consumers have a limited power -- they can decide not to purchase something. Hence, producers have be concerned with what ordinary consumers want to buy, since that is something they cannot fully control, try though they may. In Soviet-type planning, those actors with power were able to get high quality goods produced for them. No one ever claimed that Soviet weapons were of low quality, yet they were produced via the system of central planning. Soviet military leaders, and the ministers in charge of production of military equipment, were powerful and could demand high quality products. Similarly, some of the industrial ministers in civilian sectors had the power to demand high quality products, and some Soviet industrial products were world class.6 Special enterprises produced housing for high officials, and the quality of such housing was excellent.7 Powerful Soviet officials exercised their power by their ability to discipline or demote top enterprise officials if product quality was deemed unsatisfactory. It was an effective incentive. By contrast, ordinary households had almost no power in the Soviet planning system. Enterprise managers were not rewarded and punished based on how well they satisfied household consumers. The environmental damage from Soviet-type central planning resulted from an unaccountable leadership's focus on economic growth. The absence of democratic rights for the population prevented the emergence of a strong environmental movement that could have insisted on changed priorities. For economic planning to work effectively, power must be dispersed among all of the relevant groups in the economy, not monopolized by unaccountable high officials. Models of participatory planning have been elaborated by a number of authors (Devine, 1988, 2002; Albert and Hahnel, 1991). They involve democratic participation both in the economy and the state, which must be closely intertwined in a socialist system. These models share the following five principles: 1) wide participation in decision-making by those affected by a decision; 2) representation of the population as workers, community members, and consumers on decision-making bodies; 3) a decision-making process based on negotiation and compromise, to handle the inevitable existence of opposing interests among different groups; and 4) an equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of economic and political life. If consumer representatives sat on enterprise boards and on regional and national level planning bodies, they could insist that enterprises produce high quality consumer goods that people would like to purchase, with the power to set rewards and penalties to back up their demands. If the top political leaders are dependent on popular support for staying in office, they would be under pressure to make the system work to meet the needs of ordinary people. Democratic institutions, which in a capitalist system are always limited by the enormous political power of the rich, would work far better in a socialist system that has no class of wealthy property owners. The promise of getting rich is not necessary to build an efficient, innovative economy. "Innovation Institutes" could fund the testing out of new ideas, new products, and new services. Someone with a proposal for a new restaurant or service establishment could apply for funds and leasing rights to carry out their proposal, without departing from the principle of public ownership of productive property. Modest material rewards should be sufficient to encourage innovation and new and varied services, given the presence in any population of many individuals who are personally inclined to launch new projects. By providing representation for all constituencies in the making of allocation decisions, participatory planning would provide channels for all groups to see that their needs are addressed. It also recognizes the existence of conflicting interests even in a socialist society and provides institutions in which groups can negotiate and reach compromises. For example, enterprise boards having representatives of workers, consumers, and the community could strike a reasonable balance among workers' interest in not being overworked, consumers' interest in affordable and well-made products, and the community's interest in avoiding pollution of air and water. In a country having a relatively low living standard, a system of participatory planning would allow the population to demand a high rate of economic growth though democratic decisions about the resources to be devoted to investment and improved technologies. For participatory planning to work effectively, economic decisions should be as decentralized as possible to facilitate maximum participation by affected parties. Old-style central planning was overly centralized. Some economic decisions must be made at the center, but many can be made at a regional or local level. The claim that a system based on free markets is superior to any other in efficiency, innovation, and growth has no foundation. While a capitalist market economy can develop the forces of production and bring a rising level of material consumption for part of the population, history shows that it has been unable to build a society that meets the needs of the entire population. Only socialism can assure everyone material comfort, security, and a guaranteed opportunity to participate in productive labor, without some exploiting others. Only socialism can build a society based upon the better aspects of human nature, rather than its baser aspects, and finally enable people to become the real masters of their fate. But socialism can carry out this historic mission only if it embraces democracy and popular participation as the basis of its institutions.

#### American DPS goes global---serves as a shining city on a hill, removes obstacles, and offers assistance

PSL 8 (Party for Socialism and Liberation, [https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/#](https://liberationschool.org/the-goal-of-socialism-peace-and-equality-amid-plenty/), emuse)

Experiences in socialist construction Thanks in great part to the practical experience of Lenin in making revolution, 21st-century socialists have a wealth of experience on which to base further conclusions. Marxists have been able to use accumulated theory and practice in order to lead revolutions in Russia, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, Cuba and many other countries. While there have been vast differences in the experiences of those socialist revolutions, they share one common feature: The socialist revolutions of the 20th century took place in countries where the level of productive forces was very low compared to the imperialist countries. Every successful revolution faced the primary task of developing their economies—while under constant military threat by world imperialism. For that reason, Lenin described the challenges of building communism in 1920 in very practical terms: “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” There was no hope in building socialism if the economy remained underdeveloped. Because of the combined challenges of developing the productive forces under the gun of world imperialism, no socialist revolution has yet reached a stage where the “withering away of the state” could be imagined. Imperialism has seized on any weakness in the revolutionary states in order to foment counterrevolution. Nevertheless, the working classes in the countries that have set out to build socialism have made tremendous gains. Russia’s working class in 1917 was 4 percent of the population. Within 50 years, it was the second-most powerful economy in the world. China had never been able to feed its entire population prior to the revolution. Millions died during famines in China prior to 1949. Yet after the 1949 revolution, for the first time the economy was able to feed the largest population in the world. Despite immense pressure from imperialism, Cuba has been able to achieve tremendous gains—despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Cuban workers enjoy among the highest living standards of any of their counterparts in Latin America or much of the oppressed world. The continued military and economic dominance by world imperialism—first and foremost by U.S. imperialism—has made the transition to socialism that Marx and Lenin described so far impossible. The workers’ states have needed to devote a considerable part of their social development toward the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship—the army and police—in order to defend against invasion or counterrevolution. Taking that next step will require a society based on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the United States. Toppling the world’s dominant capitalist power would not only lift a tremendous burden from the workers around the world who are trying to engage in socialist construction. It would put at the disposal of the world working class the tremendous wealth produced by the U.S. working class. All the social wealth extracted from the oppressed world by U.S. corporations and mines could be used to reverse the effects of centuries of colonial and imperialist exploitation. A revolution in the United States would undercut the economic basis for divisions among the working class that promote racism, sexism and homophobia. Socialism is a system of peace, justice and equality. The road to socialism begins with revolution in the United States.

#### Proletarianization makes class struggle inevitable---the aff accelerates and properly directs movements

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, <https://www.amazon.com/Socialism-Extinction-Automation-Capitalist-Breakdown-ebook/dp/B081FHF2ZQ>, emuse)

Those who are lucky enough to find or remain in work as the capitalist crisis deepens will see their pay and conditions savagely forced down. In April 2018, the World Bank recommended yet more deregulation in a report that said “high minimum wages, undue restrictions on hiring and firing and strict contract forms all make workers more expensive vis-à-vis technology”.[437] International capital is preparing a major assault on international labour in order to accelerate moves towards automation. Even if the next crash is not a final breakdown, significant sections of the middle classes would be proletarianised and impoverished and the reserve army of labour would swell. Class struggle would explode. Capitalists could be forced to slow down or stop the introduction of new automation by, say, a strong and militant neo-Luddite or trade union movement and – the usual driver for concessions – the desire for social peace. But the contradiction persists: capital accumulation, and staying ahead of or keeping up with competitors, requires higher productivity and therefore labour-saving innovation. The deeper capitalism sinks into crisis the more necessary it becomes to raise productivity. That is, the more workers are replaced by robots, the greater the underproduction of surplus value becomes, and yet the system will need to respond by replacing more workers with robots. If it cannot do this then capital goes unvalorised and the economy crashes. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie, a strong neo-Luddite or trade union movement would sooner or later have to be crushed. In an article in January 2018 headlined “When the next recession hits, the robots will be ready”, the Washington Post pointed out that innovations happen quickest “when employers slash payrolls going into a downturn and, out of necessity, turn to software or machinery to take over the tasks once performed by their laid-off workers”.[438] Pointing to growing expectations by economists of a financial crisis in 2020, the paper adds that the “next wave of automation won’t just be sleek robotic arms on factory floors. It will be ordering kiosks, self- service apps and software smart enough to perfect schedules and cut down on the workers needed to cover a shift. Employers are already testing these systems. A recession will force them into the mainstream.” Striking statistics from an upcoming paper by economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu “found that 88% of job loss in routine occupations occurs within 12 months of a recession. In the 1990- 1991, 2001 and 2008-2009 recessions, routine jobs accounted for ‘essentially all’ of the jobs lost. They regained almost no ground during the subsequent recoveries.”[439] Automation under capitalism is therefore accelerating the trend towards proletarianisation, higher levels of poverty and the underproduction of surplus value. It is the sharpest of sharpening contradictions, a vicious circle from which capitalism cannot escape. It is a trend which increasingly threatens a final breakdown. The ‘Leninist’ road to socialism[440] – whereby working class organisations (soviets (workers’ councils), communes etc) effectively form an independent state and then, when strong enough, destroy what is left of the capitalist state – of course seems to be dismissed now more than ever – by liberals who claim that the demise of the Soviet Union signalled the end of history;[441] by the anarchists and autonomists who believe a leap into ‘full communism’ can be achieved without the socialist stage; and by ‘democratic socialists’ who claim socialism can be built via bourgeois democracy by voting through ‘socialist policies’. Then there is the notion that Marx and Lenin are redundant because the supposed protagonist of their revolutionary strategy – the industrial proletariat – is dead or irrelevant. There are several problems surrounding this. The accusation about the industrial proletariat is made, in slightly different ways, not just by liberals but by some anarchists, who do not claim that the industrial proletariat is dead but persist with the myth that it is the protagonist of the Leninist revolution. The Bolsheviks focused on agitating among the urban or industrial proletariat because that was the most efficient use of scarce resources, with the intention that the message would then spread outwards to the wider proletariat as a whole. This accusation that Leninists ignore the wider proletariat is often a projection of valid criticisms of some ‘Trotskyists’, who, while posing as Leninists, or at least distorting Leninism, do overemphasise the importance of the industrial worker. This is because Trotskyists – who for the same reason tend to be de facto pro-imperialist (by giving critical support to the Labour Party, for example) – tend to derive from labour aristocratic positions in trade unions and universities. Lenin though is renowned for criticising socialists who limited their agitation to “trade union consciousness” or “economism” – ie, simply supporting, or tailing, working class demands, without advocating an independent (non-social democratic) working class party or proletarian dictatorship (or, before that, the overthrow of tsarism) – and for his ruthless criticism of a labour aristocratic minority which misled the masses with solely reformist demands. Hence why he said revolutionaries had to “dig deeper into the real masses” of the poorest workers, who had the least to lose and the most to gain. This meant that, in Russia, he saw the need for an alliance between workers and poor peasants, an alliance that Leon Trotsky initially rejected. Today, real Leninists still see the poorest and most oppressed workers as the main protagonists of revolution. The claim that the industrial proletariat is dead is either dishonest or smacks of ‘first world’ myopia. The industrial proletariat may have shrunk in the imperialist nations over the past 40 years but internationally it has grown spectacularly. In 2010, 79%, or 541 million, of the world’s industrial workers lived in ‘less developed regions’, up from 34% in 1950 and 53% in 1980, compared to the 145 million industrial workers, or 21% of the total, who in 2010 lived in the imperialist countries.[442] This shift is even greater in the manufacturing industry, since in emerging nations manufacturing forms a much higher proportion of total industrial employment than in imperialist countries, and therefore, as John Bellamy Foster et al point out, “the broad category of ‘industrial employment’ systematically understates the extent to which the world share of manufacturing has grown in developing countries”, citing figures for the US and China showing these ratios to be 58.1% and 75.2% respectively.[443] “Extrapolating these two ratios to ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ countries as a whole, 83% of the world’s manufacturing workforce lives and works in the nations of the Global South,” says John Smith in Imperialism in the Twenty First Century.[444] Based on the integration of ‘Southern’ workers into the global economy, the IMF has also attempted to take into account qualitative as well as quantitative changes, calculating an “export-weighted global workforce” by multiplying the numerical growth of the workforce by the increasing degree to which they produce for the global market rather than the domestic market. Since Southern-manufactured exports grew more than twice as fast as GDP during the quarter-century leading up to the global crisis in 2007, the IMF estimates that the effective global workforce quadrupled in size between 1980 and 2003. But even within the imperialist nations, where the industrial working class has declined both absolutely and relatively, Smith points to “deepening proletarianisation”, saying that “the proletarians have increased their already overwhelming predominance within the economically active population [EAP].... Between 1980 and 2005 the proportion of waged and salaried workers in total EAP in ... the developed nations steadily rose, from 83% to 88% (in 2005, around 500 million people), indicating deepening proletarianisation in these countries.”[445] In the US, it is even higher, with waged workers as a proportion of the EAP increasing from 90.6% in 1980 to 93.2% in 2011.[446] Because of distortions made by the ILO’s methods, this undoubtedly underestimates or obscures the size of the labour aristocracy, something we will come back to further on, but the trend is nevertheless clear, with more and more workers being forced into low-paid services work. Obviously with China, India and the former Soviet bloc being integrated into the global economy, 1.47 billion workers joined the global capitalist workforce very suddenly. But this does not distort the overall trend. With their supposed bias for the industrial proletariat, Leninists are accused of failing to recognise the multiple sections of the working class or its fragmentation. But far from ignoring the heterogeneous make-up of the working class, this is one of the factors that contribute to the Leninist conclusion that a vanguard party is necessary – to unite the disparate and sectional struggles of the working class into one unstoppable force. Likewise, the fact recognised across the left that technological advances have fragmented the working class, that they have increased unemployment and underemployment and therefore reduced workers’ leverage in their struggles against their bosses, reflected in the imperialist countries by the low number of strikes since the 1980s, must mean that the state is the primary battleground. We are already seeing this in the re-emergence of social democratic movements (see the previous chapter), whereby downwardly mobile labour aristocracies are becoming slightly more antagonistic towards the ruling class, and are attempting to harness the power of the working class as a whole, in what is essentially a fight with the middle and ruling classes over allocations of surplus value. These strawman accusations against Lenin misrepresent or misinterpret his definition of the proletariat, which followed Marx’s. The main feature of the proletariat as a class is not its direct link with the means of production but rather its separation from them. In other words, the proletariat is first and foremost characterised as a class by the fact that it does not own the means of production and has to work for wages. The salient feature is not what differentiates them, but what unites them. The more a worker is dependant on selling their labour power for survival the deeper their proletarianisation. Indeed, it is the fact that the industrial proletariat is shrinking relative to the working class as a whole, relegating a significant proportion of previously privileged workers into the poorer sections of the working class, that sees the mass of the latter grow numerically in strength. As the mass of exploited manual workers decreases due to scientific and technological progress, particularly automation, the mass of exploited intellectual workers, ie white collar employees, engineers and scientists (who increasingly contribute to commodity production) also increases in reverse proportion. The casualisation of university employment in the past few years is a case in point. In the US, although union membership stood at a lowly 10.7% of the workforce at the start of 2019, the unionisation of traditionally non- unionised white collar labour almost doubled between 2010 and 2017.[447] According to the Pew Research Center, the median wealth (assets minus debts) of the US middle class fell by 28% from 2001 to 2013.[448] People on middle incomes[449] accounted for 50% of the US adult population in 2015, down from 61% in 1971, while the poorest tier of the working class comprised 20% of the population in 2015 compared to 16% in 1975. The number of people receiving supplemental nutritional assistance, or food stamps, exploded from 26 million in 2007 to 46 million in 2012.[450] And 63% of the population say they have less than $500 in personal savings.[451] At the same time private and household debt has gone through the roof. In the 1970s, personal and credit card debts shot up by 238% relative to the 1960s. In the 1980s it shot up on the previous decade by another 318% and by another 180% in the 1990s.[452] According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, household debt rose to a record $13.5 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2018, nearly 7% higher than in the third quarter of 2008. Even more troublingly, a record number of US Americans were three months or more behind on repayments for car loans (more than 7 million). As New York Times journalist Amy Chozick noted in May 2015, “the once ubiquitous term ‘middle class’ has gone conspicuously missing from the 2016 [presidential] campaign trail, as candidates and their strategists grasp for new terms for an unsettled economic era [in which] the middle class has for millions of families become a precarious place to be”.[453] Capitalism in the age of automation increasingly turns the majority of the population into proletarians and, in doing so, creates all economic, social and political prerequisites for the system’s downfall. The deeper the system sinks into crisis, the more proletarians are created, through unemployment, wage cuts and so on, and the more radical they are likely to become. This is borne out by the real development of the international proletariat. While we have already seen that the industrial proletariat has grown enormously, according to the ILO, the world’s “economically active population” (EAP) grew from 1.9 billion in 1980 to 3.1 billion in 2006.[454] Almost all of this numerical growth took place in the ‘emerging nations’, now home to 84% of the global workforce, 1.6 billion of whom worked for wages. The other one billion were small farmers and a multitude of people working in the ‘informal economy’,[455] which is, according to Mike Davis “the fastest growing social class on earth”.[456] While the industrial proletariat in the ‘Global South’ has grown enormously since 1980, its share of the South’s total workforce has been much more modest, rising from 14.5% in 1980, to 16.1% in 1990, to 19.1% in 2000, to 23.1% in 2010[457] – because the absolute growth of the non-industrial proletariat is even greater. Meanwhile, agricultural employment in the Global South has declined to 48% of its EAP, down from 73% in 1960, and from “approximately one-third” to just 4% of EAP in developed countries. However, the ILO reports: “Despite the declining share of agricultural workers in total employment, the absolute numbers of those engaged in agriculture are still rising, most notably in south Asia, east Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.”[458] The other significant component of the growing proletariat? The unemployed. Smith reports that, apart from China, “no economy has grown fast enough to provide jobs to the legions of young people entering the labour market and the rural exodus to swollen cities in search of work. Even at the zenith of export-oriented industrialisation the ILO reported that ‘in the late 20th century, manufacturing ceased being a major sector of employment growth, except in east and southeast Asia’.” Senior ILO economist Nomaan Majid said the commerce sector, not manufacturing, “is the main employment growth sector in both low- and middle-income groups”.[459] This links back to what we saw in chapter four – that even in the developing nations, the trend towards automation is accompanied by growing unproductive work and unemployment. The numerical growth of the working class has been coupled with a massive attack on its wages, further deepening proletarianisation. In a striking example of how constant capital rises relative to variable capital, John Lanchester writes in the London Review of Books that in the US: “In 1960, the most profitable company in the world’s biggest economy was General Motors (GM). In today’s money, GM made $7.6bn that year. It also employed 600,000 people. Today’s most profitable company employs 92,600. So where 600,000 workers would once generate $7.6bn in profit, now 92,600 generate $89.9bn, an improvement in profitability per worker of 76.65 times. Remember, this is pure profit for the company’s owners, after all workers have been paid. Capital isn’t just winning against labour: there’s no contest. If it were a boxing match, the referee would stop the fight.”[460] Whereas wages in the US rose by 350% between 1927 and 1977, real terms growth has since been in decline. In Britain, wages grew at an annual average of 2.9% in the 1960s and 70s, 1.5% in the 90s and 1.2% in the 2000s. Between 2007 and 2015 that trend accelerated at an unprecedented rate, with real household wages falling by 10.4%.[461] The Resolution Foundation said the 2010s would be the worst decade for UK wage growth since the late 18th century. But as bad as the attack on wages in imperialist countries has been, it has been even worse in the countries imperialism plunders, where workers are of course already paid much less. According to the ILO’s World of Work Report 2011, since the early 1990s the “share of domestic income that goes to labour ... declined in nearly three-quarters of the 69 countries with available information”. While “the wage share among advanced economies has been trending downward since 1975”, it “occurred at a much more moderate pace than among emerging and developing economies – falling roughly nine percentage points since 1980”.[462] In contrast, the fall in Asia between 1994 and 2010 was around 20%. The imperialist countries have also seen a decline in full-time self- employment and self-employed income. This has included a continuing shrinkage in the number of small family farmers, indicating the proletarianisation of portions of the lower middle classes. Michael Elsby’s study The Decline of US Labor Share reports that the “rise in inequality is even more striking for proprietors’ income than it is for payroll income. In 1948 the bottom 90% of employees earned 75% of payroll compensation. By 2010 this had declined to 54%. For entrepreneurial income, however, this fraction plummeted from 42% in 1948 to 14% in 2010.”[463] A separate study of 2014 data by the US Small Business Administration suggests the same pattern regarding millennials (generally defined as people born between 1985 and 2004). “Fewer than 4% of 30 year-olds reported they were in full-time self-employment – a proxy for entrepreneurship – compared with 5.4% of Generation X-ers [1965 and 1984] and 6.7% of Baby Boomers [1945 and 1964] at the same age,” the FT reported.[464] Furthermore, the pace of decline in wages has accelerated in recent years, “with the wage share falling more than 11 percentage points between 2002 and 2006. In China, the wage share declined by close to 10 percentage points since 2000.”[465] Africa’s workers saw their share of national income reduced by 15% in the two decades since 1990, again “with most of this decline – 10 percentage points – taking place since 2000. The decline is even more spectacular in north Africa, where the wage share fell by more than 30 percentage points after 2000.”[466] Latin America saw the lowest decline, of 10% since 1993, and most of it before 2000, undoubtedly due to strong workers’ organisation and resistance, represented by the left-wing ‘Pink Tide’ in Venezuela,[467] Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina. As mentioned, mainstream economic accounting methods underepresent the size of the middle classes and labour aristocracy – which are bound to be proportionately bigger in imperialist nations – and do not take account of sharply increasing inequality between skilled/professional and unskilled workers or of income to capital that has been classified as income to labour, such as bonuses paid to bankers and wages and sponsorship of sports professionals etc, meaning the real extent of the fall in labour’s share is even higher, and considerably so. Elsby attempts to challenge these distortions, writing that in the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) calculation of a decline of 3.9% in the share of national income for labour over 1987-2013 becomes a 10% decline when the highest paid 1% of employees are excluded, and a 14% decline when the highest paid 10% are excluded. Based on this more honest method, the lowest 90% of wage earners (84% of the US’s total economically active population) actually earned 42% of the total payroll in 1980 and just 28% in 2011. Elsby also found that the fall for labour has accelerated as time has progressed, declining by twice as much between 2000 and 2011 as in the previous two decades.[468] Again, the trend towards deepening proletarianisation is clear. The material basis for a position of relative privilege among the lower middle classes and labour aristocracy is disappearing. The proletariat is numerically stronger than ever, especially as an international class. ‘Neoliberal globalisation’, which promised to produce prosperous nations of entrepreneurs and homeowners, has instead produced capitalism’s grave-diggers. All this is confirmed by the fact that inequality has hit record levels. In 2018 and 2019, Oxfam found that the 26 richest billionaires owned as much in assets as the 3.8 billion people who make up the poorest half of the planet’s population. The number had been 61 in 2016 and 43 in 2017, showing again that capital continues to centralise. Marx wrote that the concentration of wealth at one pole depended on the concentration of poverty at the other. And lo: the wealth of more than 2,200 billionaires across the globe increased by $900bn in 2018, a 12% increase against a fall of 11% in the wealth of the poorest half of the world’s population. Between 1980 and 2015, the global economy grew by 380%, yet the number of people living in poverty on less than $5 (£3.20) a day increased by more than 1.1 billion. In 1980, $2.20 of every $100 went to the world’s poorest 20%, but in 2003 that figure had fallen to 60 cents.[469] Inequality is most acute between rich and poor countries but it is growing within rich countries as well. In the US, for example, according to the Federal Reserve, the richest 1% owned a record-high 38.6% of the country’s wealth in 2016, nearly twice as much as the bottom 90%. Anti-socialists will still ignore all this or proclaim that the proletariat is no longer a revolutionary class because living standards are generally much higher than 100 years ago, claiming that really “we are all middle class now” or making shallow observations such as “capitalism works because workers have mobile phones!” as if cracking some kind of insightful gotcha that disproves Marxism. This ignores how as the rate of exploitation increases, the value of necessary labour falls, making the commodities workers need to buy to live cheaper. It ignores how the needs of the working class change as capitalism develops: workers need smartphones and laptops in this day and age of 24-hour connectivity if they are even to be considered employable, and so the cost of a smartphone is included in the value of labour power. It also ignores that workers in some countries may have access to better infrastructure than in others (indeed, although no technology has ever scaled as quickly as the mobile phone, while five billion people now have mobile phones, only around 2.5 billion of world’s population presently have a smartphone). But most of all, it is ignorant of the fact that capitalism is breaking down, which will impoverish and radicalise the working class. The revolutionary power of the working class is latent.

# 2AC

## Adv---Solvency

### 2AC---AT: Slow

#### Its fast and nationalism has an empirical basis---no new court doctrine needed

**Alperovitz 12** [Gar Alperovitz, a professor of political economy at the University of Maryland, “Wall Street Is Too Big To Regulate,” July 23, 2012, Section A, Page 21 of the New York Times]

Some economists in and around the University of Chicago, who founded the modern conservative tradition, had a surprisingly different take: When it comes to the really big fish in the economic pond, some felt, the only way to preserve competition was to nationalize the largest ones, which defied regulation.

This notion seems counterintuitive: after all, the school’s founders provided the intellectual framework for the laissez-faire turn against market regulation over the last half-century. But for them, “bigness” and competition could easily become mutually exclusive. One of the most important Chicago School leaders, Henry C. Simons, judged in 1934 that “the corporation is simply running away with our economic (and political) system.”

Simons (a hero of the libertarian idol Milton Friedman) was skeptical of enormity. “Few of our gigantic corporations,” he wrote, “can be defended on the ground that their present size is necessary to reasonably full exploitation of production economies.”

The central problem, then as now, was that very large corporations could easily undermine regulatory and antitrust strategies. The Nobel laureate George J. Stigler demonstrated how regulation was commonly “designed and operated primarily for” the benefit of the industries involved. And numerous conservatives, including Simons, concluded that large corporate players could thwart antitrust “break-them-up” efforts — a view Friedman came to share.

Simons did not shrink from the obvious conclusion: “Every industry should be either effectively competitive or socialized.” If other remedies were unworkable, “The state should face the necessity of actually taking over, owning, and managing directly” all “industries in which it is impossible to maintain effectively competitive conditions.”

At the height of the Depression, eight major economists (including Frank H. Knight) put forward a “Chicago Plan” that called for outright ownership of Federal Reserve Banks, the nationalization of money creation, and the transformation of banks into highly restricted savings-and-loan-like institutions.

To be sure, Simons later revised some of his views, and in the main he and others weren’t focused on financial crises. After all, in the mid-20th century, banks were far less concentrated than they are today, when the five biggest — JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs — dominate the industry, with combined assets amounting to more than half of the nation’s economy.

It’s also true that not all Chicago School economists (not to mention their descendants) agreed with Simons, especially on the controversial issue of nationalization. But the logic of his argument remains: With high-paid lobbyists contesting every proposed regulation, it is increasingly clear that big banks can never be effectively controlled as private businesses. If an enterprise (or five of them) is so large and so concentrated that competition and regulation are impossible, the most market-friendly step is to nationalize its functions.

What about breaking up the banks, as many on the left favor? Recent history confirms another Chicago School judgment: while a breakup might work in the short term, the most likely course is what happened with Standard Oil and AT&T, which were broken up, only to essentially recombine a few decades later.

Nationalization isn’t as difficult as it sounds. We tend to forget that we did, in fact, nationalize General Motors in 2009; the government still owns a controlling share of its stock. We also essentially nationalized the American International Group, one of the largest insurance companies in the world, and the government still owns roughly 60 percent of its stock.

## Adv---Crisis

### 2AC---C/T---CPT

#### Empirics prove developed socialist countries are the most peaceful

Oren and Hays 97 - poli sci professors (Ido and Jude, <https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/40645008>, EM)

We find that during the cold war, developed socialist states were, by a wide margin, less war-prone than all other states. Developing socialist states were the most war-prone, while developed capitalist and developing capitalist states were respectively the second and third most war-prone groups. These findings are highly robust. They hold across three different counts of war (based on three separate data sets) , and they hold whether we measure war propensity in terms of wars engaged in annually or in terms of wars entered into. Now, one might question our conclusion regarding the pacific nature of the developed socialist camp on the ground that most of this camp's members were mere satellites of the Soviet Union and that, therefore, their peacefulness reflects lack of political ability to wage war, more than lack of political will. To this objection we offer two responses. First, arguments that stress the coercive character of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe implicitly tend to compare the rigidly hierarchical intrasocialist relations with a mythical West in which allies of the United States were allegedly unconstrained in their conduct of foreign policy. But once intrasocialist relations are compared with a more realistic image of intracapitalist relations - properly acknowledging that allies of the United States were not fully free to act as they pleased either - the contrast between East and West blurs considerably, although it does not dissolve entirely. Secondly, let us compare directly the war-frequency records of the United States and the Soviet Union alone. As the leading superpowers of the era, these countries were the least fettered by alliance constraints in their decisions for war and peace. If the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, is found to have been more peaceful than its capitalist counterpart, the proposition that advanced socialist states are most peaceful would gain added credibility. The number of wars in which the United States and the Soviet Union were involved during the period 1949-1989 (through 1988 for the Tillema data), are reported in the top row of table 11. Clearly, the Soviet Union fought fewer wars than did the United States. The ratios of Soviet to US wars are .50, .27, and .54 for the COW, Gantzel, and Tillema data, respectively. If we take war-duration into consideration, adding up the number of wars each superpower was involved in every year (see the bottom row of table 11), the difference between the war propensities of the two countries becomes even starker: the ratios of Soviet to US war-years are .08, .28, and .39 for the COW, Gantzel, and Tillema data sets, respectively.39 Thus, it appears that not only did advanced socialist countries as a group fight much more rarely than the advanced capitalist counterparts, so did their leader in comparison with the leader of the capitalist world. Conclusion In this study we analyzed the comparative war propensities of groups of states classified in accordance with the analytical categories of the Soviet theory of international relations. We found that during the period 1949-1989, developed socialist states went to war very rarely. The foreign-policy behavior of developed socialist states was significantly more peaceful than the behavior of any other socioeconomic group of states, including capitalist states. On the other hand, the group of developing socialist states was more war-prone than any other group of states during the same period. In other words, our results show that during the Cold War, advanced socialist countries were far more peaceful than the developing and the developed capitalist countries (in that order), who in turn were more peaceful than developing socialist states. Our goal is not to romanticize or resurrect the Soviet theory of international relations, but to "normalize" US social-scientific claims about the peacefulness of democratic countries.

### 2AC---CPT---AT: Trade

#### Capitalism makes global trade collapse inevitable---transition is key

Galbraith ’18 [James K.; July 23; Professor at UT-Austin, was a delegate, at 20, to the Democratic National Convention in 1972; he teaches at the LBJ School, the University of Texas at Austin; The Nation, “Extreme Inequality Creates Global Disorder,” https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/extreme-inequality-creates-global-disorder]

The principal driver of global inequality—both within and between countries—is the global financial regime. This has been a feature since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, with recurrent catastrophic effects following the onset of the 1980s debt crisis, including the collapse of the socialist nations and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Back then, it was a conservative stroke of genius to institutionalize “market exchange rates” on a global scale. Those markets work well enough for rich nations, but they guarantee problems for everyone else. Each exchange crisis has wiped out a decade or more of progress against inequality, as anyone in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, or much of Africa will tell you. The rise of China, on the other hand, has everything to do with its refusal to play the game of open capital markets. And while inequality in China rose rapidly for internal reasons beginning in the 1990s, it stabilized more than a decade ago.

Global inequality is a security risk—and not just because it breeds resentment, violence, and mass migrations. It also makes the entire system prone to collapse. For over 40 years, the United States has enjoyed the advantage of issuing the world’s reserve currency, running a trade deficit, and living well off the work of others. But the respect that would be due to exercising that role responsibly has been squandered by our behavior.

Reckless interventions have demonstrated the limits of military power—as our professional soldiers can attest, and as the current state of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate. A self-centered economic strategy is only a bit more subtle. Yes, even when a financial crisis originates in the United States, as happened with the subprime-mortgage debacle of 2007–09, funds still flow to the safety of the US dollar and government bonds. So long as this pattern holds, the United States actually benefits from economic insecurity and instability, both at home and abroad. But you have to be very optimistic—or flat-out crazy—to think that this can go on indefinitely.

Controlling inequality—like controlling blood pressure—is good for your economic health. Economies with less inequality generally have lower unemployment and stronger productivity growth, and some researchers also claim better human health and social cohesion. In terms of the rest of the world, the peculiar organization of the United States into a boom/bust economy based on finance and high technology is the exception rather than the rule: We combine record-breaking inequality with low unemployment. But this is a formula that generates massive instability, as well as the resentments that gave us President Trump. Countries with stronger stabilizing institutions built on the principle of countervailing power may be less rich over the short term, but they are better-governed and built to last.

Our long-term safety and prosperity will therefore depend on creating a more just and stable world banking and monetary system. We can either get to work on this ourselves, or accept that other large countries and blocs will take up the task, creating regional alliances that will restructure global trade and finance—as is already beginning to happen. If we are not part of a common process, then ultimately we will be cut out and cut back. No one should think that a policy of provoking and destabilizing Russia, China, and Iran is going to work for us, over the long or even the medium run. No one should think that Europe and Japan will stay US economic allies forever if their interests dictate otherwise. No one should imagine that military power provides enduring safety in a world of multiple major powers with their own resources, technologies, and ideas.

In the United States, the key driver of inequality is capital-asset prices. This is because in a capitalist nation, capitalists and not workers own such assets and get their income from dividends, interest, stock options, and capital gains. Capitalist booms yield prosperity—often a wasteful prosperity—along with instability; as the bankers say, it’s not the speed that kills, it’s the sudden stop. Concentrated ownership of capital assets is therefore a central issue. Spreading the wealth sensibly over time means more public investment at every level and more investment by nonprofits with longer time horizons and sensible social objectives. It means fostering cooperatives and other stabilizing private economic forms that are not dependent on Wall Street. Instead of boosting the economic growth rate—a measure largely disconnected from social well-being—we should have a strategy to live better: more sustainably, more equally, with less waste and more common spaces, more public goods and enjoyments.

## Adv---Innovation

### 2AC---C/T---Innovation

#### Corporate lysenkoism collapses scientific progress---its also an epistemological reason to discount neg evidence

UCS ‘12 - nonprofit science advocacy organization (Union of Concerned Scientists, <https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/heads-they-win-summary.pdf>, EM)

Access to the best available science allows federal decisionmakers to craft policies that protect our health and safety and the environment. Unfortunately, censorship of scientists and the manipulation, distortion, and suppression of scientific information has threatened the federal scientific enterprise in recent years. This serious problem has sparked much debate, but few have analyzed the key driver of political interference in federal science: the inappropriate influence of companies with a financial stake in the outcome. This influence affects not only the science used in decision making, but also public opinion and the decision-making process itself. By better understanding how corporations influence the use of science in federal decision making, we can both hold companies and policy makers accountable for their actions and ensure that the nation develops science-based policies that serve the public interest. The first chapter of this report explores the numerous methods corporate interests employ to inappropriately influence how the federal government uses science to make decisions. The second chapter provides an overview of the steps the Obama administration has taken to restore scientific integrity to federal policy making. The third chapter focuses on the federal reforms still essential to ensure that authoritative and independent scientific information informs policies designed to protect public health and the environment. Recognizing that solving this problem extends far beyond what the government can accomplish alone, we also suggest broader reforms that corporations, the scientific community, academic institutions, news media, and the courts can pursue to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of science. The twenty-first century presents the United States and the world with urgent science-based challenges. We must have the ability to use independent science to address problems such as the need for high-quality yet affordable health care, terrorism, climate change, rising demand for energy and natural resources, population growth, and the loss of biodiversity, and to anticipate and tackle challenges unknown today. Methods of Abuse Corporations attempt to exert influence at every step of the scientific and policy-making processes, often to shape decisions in their favor or avoid regulation and monitoring of their products and by-products at the public’s expense. In so doing, they often attempt to fundamentally alter the decision-making process and exploit executive branch agencies, Congress, and the courts. Corrupting the Science Corporations that stand to lose from the results of independent scientific inquiry have gone to great lengths to manipulate and control science and scientists by: Terminating and suppressing research. Companies have controlled the dissemination of scientific information by ending or withholding results of research that they sponsor that would threaten their bottom line. Intimidating or coercing scientists. Corporations bury scientific information by harassing scientists and their institutions into silence. Scientists have been threatened with litigation and the loss of their jobs, have had their research defunded, have been refused promotion or tenure, and have been transferred to non-research positions, leading to self-censorship and changes in research direction. Manipulating study designs and research protocols. Corporations have employed flawed methodologies in testing and research—such as by changing the questions scientists are asking—that are biased toward predetermined results. Ghostwriting scientific articles. Corporations corrupt the integrity of scientific journals by planting ghostwritten articles about their products. Rather than submitting articles directly, companies recruit scientists or contract with research organizations to publish articles that obscure the sponsors’ involvement. Publication bias. Corporations selectively publish positive results while underreporting negative results. While not directly corrupting science itself, these publishing and reporting biases skew the body of evidence. Shaping Public Perception Armed with public relations teams, private interests have launched campaigns that influence public opinion and undermine understanding of scientific consensus. Among their methods: Downplaying evidence and playing up false uncertainty. As scientific understanding of the health effects of products and substances such as tobacco and particulate emissions emerges, companies fight regulation by attacking the science, downplaying scientific consensus, exaggerating scientific uncertainty and spreading doubt. Vilifying scientists. Scientists analyzing the health and environmental effects of products such as asbestos and lead, and phenomena such as climate change, are publicly criticized and attacked. These attacks and allegations of misconduct discredit the scientists and deter them from continuing their research. Promoting experts who undermine the scientific consensus. Corporations promote individuals who overemphasize research that appears to cast doubt on the scientific consensus. Often their expertise is not in a relevant field, limiting their ability to effectively evaluate the scientific findings they are criticizing. Hiding behind front groups or “capturing” organizations. Companies use front groups, public relations firms, and other paid consultants to covertly advance corporate interests while these entities maintain the illusion of independence. Influencing the media. Corporations inaccurately portray science by feeding the media slanted reports and news stories, or biased spokespeople.

#### **Socialism is more efficient than capitalism**

Alexander 14 - acclaimed political commentator whose work is regularly praised by top academics (Scott, <https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/24/book-review-red-plenty/>, emuse)

There’s a very settled modern explanation of the conflict between capitalism and communism. Capitalism is good at growing the economy and making countries rich. Communism is good at caring for the poor and promoting equality. So your choice between capitalism and communism is a trade-off between those two things. But for at least the first fifty years of the Cold War, the Soviets would not have come close to granting you that these are the premises on which the battle must be fought. They were officially quite certain that any day now Communism was going to prove itself better at economic growth, better at making people rich quickly, than capitalism. Even unofficially, most of their leaders and economists were pretty certain of it. And for a little while, even their capitalist enemies secretly worried they were right. The arguments are easy to understand. Under capitalism, plutocrats use the profits of industry to buy giant yachts for themselves. Under communism, the profits can be reinvested back into the industry to build more factories or to make production more efficient, increasing growth rate. Under capitalism, everyone is competing with each other, and much of your budget is spent on zero-sum games like advertising and marketing and sales to give you a leg up over your competition. Under communism, there is no need to play these zero-sum games and that part of the budget can be reinvested to grow the industry more quickly. Under capitalism, everyone is working against everyone else. If Ford discovers a clever new car-manufacturing technique, their first impulse is to patent it so GM can’t use it, and GM’s first impulse is to hire thousands of lawyers to try to thwart that attempt. Under communism, everyone is working together, so if one car-manufacturing collective discovers a new technique they send their blueprints to all the other car-manufacturing collectives in order to help them out. So in capitalism, each company will possess a few individual advances, but under communism every collective will have every advance, and so be more productive. These arguments make a lot of sense to me, and they definitely made sense to the Communists of the first half of the 20th century. As a result, they were confident of overtaking capitalism. They realized that they’d started with a [disadvantage] – czarist Russia had been dirt poor and almost without an industrial base – and that they’d faced a further [disadvantage] in having the Nazis burn half their country during World War II – but they figured as soon as they overcame these [disadvantages] their natural advantages would let them leap ahead of the West in only a couple of decades. The great Russian advances of the 50s – Sputnik, Gagarin, etc – were seen as evidence that this was already starting to come true in certain fields. And then it all went wrong. II. Grant that communism really does have the above advantages over capitalism. What advantage does capitalism have? The classic answer is that during communism no one wants to work hard. They do as little as they can get away with, then slack off because they don’t reap the rewards of their own labor. Red Plenty doesn’t really have theses. In fact, it’s not really a non-fiction work at all. It’s a dramatized series of episodes in the lives of Russian workers, politicians, and academics, intended to come together to paint a picture of how the Soviet economy worked. But if I can impose a thesis upon the text, I don’t think it agreed with this. In certain cases, Russians were very well-incentivized by things like “We will kill you unless you meet the production target”. Later, when the state became less murder-happy, the threat of death faded to threats of demotions, ruined careers, and transfer to backwater provinces. And there were equal incentives, in the form of promotion or transfer to a desirable location such as Moscow, for overperformance. There were even monetary bonuses, although money bought a lot less than it did in capitalist countries and was universally considered inferior to status in terms of purchasing power. Yes, there were [Goodhart’s Law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law) type issues going on – if you’re being judged per product, better produce ten million defective products than 9,999,999 excellent products – but that wasn’t the crux of the problem. Red Plenty presented the problem with the Soviet economy primarily as one of allocation. You could have a perfectly good factory that could be producing lots of useful things if only you had one extra eensy-weensy part, but unless the higher-ups had allocated you that part, you were out of luck. If that part happened to break, getting a new one would depend on how much clout you (and your superiors) pulled versus how much clout other people who wanted parts (and their superiors) held. The book illustrated this reality with a series of stories (I’m not sure how many of these were true, versus useful dramatizations). In one, a pig farmer in Siberia needed wood in order to build sties for his pigs so they wouldn’t freeze – if they froze, he would fail to meet his production target and his career would be ruined. The government, which mostly dealt with pig farming in more temperate areas, hadn’t accounted for this and so hadn’t allocated him any wood, and he didn’t have enough clout with officials to request some. A factory nearby had extra wood they weren’t using and were going to burn because it was too much trouble to figure out how to get it back to the government for re-allocation. The farmer bought the wood from the factory in an under-the-table deal. He was caught, which usually wouldn’t have been a problem because everybody did this sort of thing and it was kind of the “smoking marijuana while white” of Soviet offenses. But at that particular moment the Party higher-ups in the area wanted to make an example of someone in order to look like they were on top of their game to their higher-ups. The pig farmer was sentenced to years of hard labor. A tire factory had been assigned a tire-making machine that could make 100,000 tires a year, but the government had gotten confused and assigned them a production quota of 150,000 tires a year. The factory leaders were stuck, because if they tried to correct the government they would look like they were challenging their superiors and get in trouble, but if they failed to meet the impossible quota, they would all get demoted and their careers would come to an end. They learned that the tire-making-machine-making company had recently invented a new model that really could make 150,000 tires a year. In the spirit of [Chen Sheng](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dazexiang_Uprising), they decided that since the penalty for missing their quota was something terrible and the penalty for sabotage was also something terrible, they might as well take their chances and destroy their own machinery in the hopes the government sent them the new improved machine as a replacement. To their delight, the government believed their story about an “accident” and allotted them a new tire-making machine. However, the tire-making-machine-making company had decided to cancel production of their new model. You see, the new model, although more powerful, weighed less than the old machine, and the government was measuring their production by kilogram of machine. So it was easier for them to just continue making the old less powerful machine. The tire factory was allocated another machine that could only make 100,000 tires a year and was back in the same quandary they’d started with. It’s easy to see how all of these problems could have been solved (or would never have come up) in a capitalist economy, with its use of prices set by supply and demand as an allocation mechanism. And it’s easy to see how thoroughly the Soviet economy was sabotaging itself by avoiding such prices. III. The “hero” of Red Plenty – although most of the vignettes didn’t involve him directly – was Leonid Kantorovich, a Soviet mathematician who thought he could solve the problem. He invented the technique of [linear programming](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_programming), a method of solving optimization problems perfectly suited to allocating resources throughout an economy. He immediately realized its potential and wrote a nice letter to Stalin politely suggesting his current method of doing economics was wrong and he could do better – this during a time when everyone else in Russia was desperately trying to avoid having Stalin notice them because he tended to kill anyone he noticed. Luckily the letter was intercepted by a kindly mid-level official, who kept it away from Stalin and warehoused Kantorovich in a university somewhere. During the “Khruschev thaw”, Kantorovich started getting some more politically adept followers, the higher-ups started taking note, and there was a real movement to get his ideas implemented. A few industries were run on Kantorovichian principles as a test case and seemed to do pretty well. There was an inevitable backlash. Opponents accused the linear programmers of being capitalists-in-disguise, which wasn’t helped by their use of something called “shadow prices”. But the combination of their own political adeptness and some high-level support from Khruschev – who alone of all the Soviet leaders seemed to really believe in his own cause and be a pretty okay guy – put them within arm’s reach of getting their plans implemented. But when elements of linear programming were adopted, they were adopted piecemeal and toothless. The book places the blame on Alexei Kosygen, who implemented [a bunch of economic reforms that failed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Soviet_economic_reform), in a chapter that makes it clear exactly how constrained the Soviet leadership really was. You hear about Stalin, you imagine these guys having total power, but in reality they walked a narrow line, and all these “shadow prices” required more political capital than they were willing to mobilize, even when they thought Kantorovich might have a point. IV. In the end, I was left with two contradictory impressions from the book. First, amazement that the Soviet economy got as far as it did, given how incredibly screwed up it was. You hear about how many stupid things were going on at every level, and you think: This was the country that built Sputnik and Mir? This was the country that almost buried us beneath the tide of history? It is a credit to the Russian people that they were able to build so much as a screwdriver in such conditions, let alone a space station. But second, a sense of what could have been. What if Stalin hadn’t murdered most of the competent people? What if entire fields of science hadn’t been banned for silly reasons? What if Kantorovich had been able to make the Soviet leadership base its economic planning around linear programming? How might history have turned out differently? One of the book’s most frequently-hammered-in points was that there was was a brief moment, back during the 1950s, when everything seemed to be going right for Russia. Its year-on-year GDP growth (as estimated by impartial outside observers) was somewhere between 7 to 10%. Starvation was going down. Luxuries were going up. Kantorovich was fixing entire industries with his linear programming methods. Then Khruschev made a serious of crazy loose cannon decisions, he was ousted by Brezhnev, Kantorovich was pushed aside and ignored, the “Khruschev thaw” was reversed and tightened up again, and everything stagnated for the next twenty years. If Khruschev had stuck around, if Kantorovich had succeeded, might the common knowledge that Communism is terrible at producing material prosperity look a little different? The book very briefly mentioned a competing theory of resource allocation promoted by Victor Glushkov, a cyberneticist in Ukraine. He thought he could use computers – then a very new technology – to calculate optimal allocation for everyone. He failed to navigate the political seas as adroitly as Kantorovich’s faction, and the killing blow was a paper that pointed out that for him to do everything really correctly would take a hundred million years of computing time. That was in 1960. If computing power doubles every two years, we’ve undergone about 25 doubling times since then, suggesting that we ought to be able to perform Glushkov’s calculations in three years – or three days, if we give him a lab of three hundred sixty five computers to work with. There could have been this entire field of centralized economic planning. Maybe it would have continued to underperform prices. Or maybe after decades of trial and error across the entire Soviet Union, it could have caught up. We’ll never know. Glushkov and Kantorovich were marginalized and left to play around with toy problems until their deaths in the 80s, and as far as I know their ideas were never developed further in the context of a national planned economy. V. One of the ways people like insulting smart people, or rational people, or scientists, is by telling them they’re the type of people who are attracted to Communism. “Oh, you think you can control and understand everything, just like the Communists did.” And I had always thought this was a pretty awful insult. The people I know who most identify as rationalists, or scientifically/technically minded, are also most likely to be libertarian. So there, case dismissed, everybody go home. This book was the first time that I, as a person who considers himself rationally/technically minded, realized that I was super attracted to Communism. Here were people who had a clear view of the problems of human civilization – all the greed, all the waste, all the zero-sum games. Who had the entire population united around a vision of a better future, whose backers could direct the entire state to better serve the goal. All they needed was to solve the engineering challenges, to solve the equations, and there they were, at the golden future. And they were smart enough to be worthy of the problem – Glushkov invented cybernetics, Kantorovich won a Nobel Prize in Economics. And in the end, they never got the chance. There’s an interpretation of Communism as a refutation of social science, here were these people who probably knew some social science, but did it help them run a state, no it didn’t. But from the little I learned about Soviet history from this book, this seems diametrically wrong. The Soviets had practically no social science. They hated social science. You would think they would at least have some good Marxists, but apparently Stalin killed all of them just in case they might come up with versions of Marxism he didn’t like, and in terms of a vibrant scholarly field it never recovered. Economics was tainted with its association with capitalism from the very beginning, and when it happened at all it was done by non-professionals. Kantorovich was a mathematician by training; Glushkov a computer scientist. Soviet Communism isn’t what happens when you let nerds run a country, it’s what happens when you kill all the nerds who are experts in country-running, bring in nerds from unrelated fields to replace them, then make nice noises at those nerds in principle while completely ignoring them in practice. Also, you ban all Jews from positions of importance, because fuck you.

### 2AC---Innovation---AT: Space Col

#### Genuine colonization requires long-term, non-profitable investments that only socialism can achieve---capitalism stops at space tourism

Phillips ’21 [Leigh Phillips is a science writer and EU affairs journalist, “We Don’t Need Elon Musk to Explore the Solar System,” Jacobin, May 2021, <https://jacobinmag.com/2021/05/elon-musk-space-exploration-mars-colonization>]

Plainly, then, there is no rush for any of this, even as there is a moral imperative for us, one day in the distant future, to permanently exit Earth. Our colonization of other worlds is akin to the building of the grandest cathedral we have ever envisaged: a project that will take centuries, or more likely millennia, many millennia. This is nothing that a private company can deliver. There is no near-term return on investment; indeed, there is no aim of profitability at all, but rather of our species’ survival through the eons.

Rocks Are Not People

There are those who argue, perhaps because space colonization and colonization of the New World have a word in common, that the desire to journey into space is expressive of a colonial mentality.

From a trivial point of view, it is indeed colonial, insofar as the object is to build colonies. But there is a big difference between the conquest of the indigenous peoples of the Americas and the Antipodes: the Moon and Mars are rocks, not human beings.

A view of Earth from the Moon’s surface.

Indeed, the equivalence of rocks and people, or rather the notion that the human inhabitants of these lands did not count as people, is precisely the moral calculus that was made by the genocidaires of colonialism.

If we find microbial life on Mars, again, microbes are not people. We, of course, must be very careful upon our early visits to other worlds that we do not accidentally introduce terrestrial microbes. We have one chance to see whether life evolved elsewhere. If we contaminate Mars with bacteria or archaea from Earth before we make this assessment, it may be difficult to tell Martian and Earth microbes apart.

Such contamination protocols, however, only need be carried out until the otherwise pristine conditions have been sufficiently studied. The only question here is how long and how much effort should be made. Following such research, there is no distinction between terrestrial microbes establishing themselves on Mars (or any other world) and what would have occurred had microbes caught a ride on a meteor from one world to another without any human contribution.

And, if terrestrial microbes later outcompeted Martian microbes as a result, again, this would be no different from competition for resources between species on Earth, which, along with predation and symbiosis and other inter-species interactions, form the basis for many ecosystem properties and processes. Again, that’s not colonialism. That’s life!

Carl Sagan’s Dream

In our critiques of centibillionaires like Elon Musk, we should be very careful not to argue that, whatever he wants, we simply want the opposite. That’s the case for much recent popular writing critical of the private space sector.

It’s true that our vision of space — as a commons for all humanity, driven by democratic states — is very different from that of Musk, and that, indeed, the capitalist class’s power is a barrier to that vision. But we should reject what the late philosopher Mark Fisher called capitalist realism: not merely the concession that there is no alternative to the current order but the inability to conceive that there can be one.

Market ideology is so ingrained even in the minds of its opponents that a public-sector program of space exploration, travel, resource extraction, and, at some point in the future, colonization, cannot be fathomed. The critique surrounding space should instead be that, so long as it is for profit or national pride, space programs will never be able to live up to Carl Sagan’s dream of our species as the dandelion of the cosmos.

We can learn something from the technological and humanist optimism of the first person in space. “Nothing will stop us. The road to the stars is steep and dangerous. But we’re not afraid,” Yuri Gagarin told Space World magazine. “Spaceflights can’t be stopped. This isn’t the work of any one man or even a group of men. It is a historical process which mankind is carrying out in accordance with the natural laws of human development.”

More Sputnik and less SpaceX, maybe, but ad astra per aspera nevertheless.

### 2AC---Innovation---AT: Environment

#### Capitalism-based innovation can’t solve---empirics, rebound, outsourcing, and politics

John Wiseman 17, Professorial Research Fellow at the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute and with the Climate and Energy College, University of Melbourne, Adjunct Professor at the Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Development and Climate Change Policy Adviser, Sustainability Victoria, Ph.D. from Latrobe University, Samuel Alexander, lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, 2017, “The Degrowth Imperative: Reducing Energy and Resource Consumption as an Essential Component in Achieving Carbon Budget Targets,” in Transitioning to a Post-Carbon Society, p. 95-97

The first heroic assumption underpinning techno-optimist solutions is the ongoing reliance in many of the most influential large scale decarbonization strategies on CCS (carbon capture and storage). While CCS may play a valuable, albeit modest, long term role, the current state of knowledge suggests that we are still a very long way from affordable and scalable CCS deployment. Even the Global CCS Institute (2013: 5) has recently reported that, “while CCS projects are progressing, the pace is well below the level required for CCS to make substantial contribution to climate change mitigation”. The growing “emissions gap” is also providing increasing impetus for speculation about the “necessity” of geoengineering “solutions” with all their attendant concerns about ethical implications and unintended consequences (see Hamilton 2013).

The second debatable assumption is that technological innovation will necessarily and rapidly translate into global reductions in energy consumption. Important questions remain about the speed with which 100% renewable energy can realistically be achieved (see e.g. Smil 2010, 2014); the extent of fossil fuel energy consumption required to drive the initial massive expansion in renewable energy infrastructure; and the full life cycle energy return on investment (EROI) outcomes of solar and wind energy—particularly if these calculations factor in the full costs of energy storage (see e.g. Palmer 2013; Prieto and Hall 2013). Noting that emissions reductions of 4% p.a. in an economy growing at 2% p.a. are likely to require carbon intensity improvements of around 6% p.a., Anderson (2013) notes that he has yet to find any credible mainstream economist prepared to argue that prolonged emissions reductions of 3% or 4% or more are compatible with economic growth.

Indeed, as Lord Stern (2006: 231) himself has noted: There is likely to be a maximum practical rate at which global emissions can be reduced. At the national level, there are examples of sustained emissions cuts of up to 1% per year associated with structural change in energy systems... whilst maintaining strong economic growth. However, cuts in emissions greater than this have historically been associated only with economic recession or upheaval, for example, the emissions reduction of 5.2% per year for a decade associated with the economic transition and strong reduction in output in the former Soviet Union. These magnitudes of cuts suggest it is likely to be very challenging to reduce emissions by more than a few percent per year while maintaining strong economic growth.

The third reason for caution in assuming overly optimistic relationships between technological innovation, carbon intensity and emissions reductions is the impact of the “rebound effect” (see Jevons 1865; Herring and Sorrell 2009; Holm and Englund 2009; Jackson 2009). This phenomenon refers to the tendency for innovation and efficiency gains to be rapidly overwhelmed as cheaper unit costs combined with the formidable reach and power of the global advertising industry enable and encourage individuals to consume more of the same or alternative services and products. The harsh reality remains that global emissions continue to grow (IPCC 2013)—along with the global trends in the consumption of energy and resources—with apparent improvements in developed economy energy efficiency often masking the reality of energy intensive production being offshored to developing economies.

The likelihood of full and fast deployment of new technologies is the fourth problematic assumption that needs to be addressed given the formidable political and social obstacles standing in the way of rapid implementation. As noted in the recent Post Carbon Pathways review of learning from the implementation of large-scale decarbonization strategies (see Wiseman et al. 2013), experienced climate scientists and policymakers consistently come to the conclusion that the key obstacles standing in the way of rapid decarbonization are political and social rather than technological. Key roadblocks include the following.

## T---Expand

### 2AC---T---Expand

#### ‘Expand’ means increasing the number, volume or extent of

Fahey ’19 [Eugene; October 22; Judge on the Court of Appeals of New York, dissenting; Westlaw, “Adirondack Wild: Friends of the Forest Pres. v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency,” 34 N.Y.3d 184]

The Rivers Act does not define the word “expanded.” “In the absence of a statutory definition, ‘we construe words of ordinary import with their usual and commonly understood meaning, and in that connection have regarded dictionary definitions as useful guideposts in determining the meaning of a word or phrase’ ” (Yaniveth R. v LTD Realty Co., 27 NY3d 186, 192 [2016], quoting Rosner v Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 96 NY2d 475, 479-480 [2001]). One ordinary meaning of “expand,” and the one relevant here, is “to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, expand [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expand]; see also Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 402 [1977] [“to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of”]). Accordingly, for DEC's determination that motor vehicle use on the road would not “expand” to be rational, there must be some basis in the record upon which DEC could reasonably conclude that once the road is opened to the public, motor vehicle use on the road would not increase in extent, number, volume, or scope.

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ has colloquial uses but zero formal definitions. ‘Core’ means essential.

Crawford ’89 [James D, James J Leyden, Frank C Sabatino, and Jack G Mancuso; October; J.D. at the University of Pennsylvania; J.D. at the University of Pennsylvania; J.D. at Notre Dame; J.D. at Pennsylvania State University; Westlaw, Brief on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, “Fmc Corporation, Petitioner, v. Cynthia Ann Holliday, Respondent.,” No. 89-1048, WL 1128234]

The Third Circuit's decision springs from the conclusion that the deemer clause only shields “core” ERISA concerns. Perhaps the most vivid defect in this fallacy is the fact that the Third Circuit had to invent the term “core,” which is not used in ERISA, has no textual basis \*24 in the relevant legislative history, and does not even have an apparent definition in this context. Yet whatever “core” may mean, the Third Circuit certainly intended it to involve matters of critical importance. Any other definition would do violence to the English language.43 Judged by this standard, Pennsylvania's constraints upon subrogation clearly impair “core” ERISA concerns, arising from fiduciary obligations at the heart of the statute.’

Footnote 43.

The definitions of the adjective “core” are: “a: a basic, essential, or enduring part (as of an individual, a class, or an entity) b: the essential meaning: GIST ... c: the inmost or most intimate part.” Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 250 (1973).

## CP---Guidance

### 2AC---CP---Guidance

#### Perm---do both

#### Perm---do the CP

#### Perm do the plan and issue guidance docs over other issues

The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector in accordance with socialism.

#### Guidance docs won’t be enforced

Haeder and Yackee 20 [Simon F. Haeder, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science in the John D. Rockefeller IV School of Policy & Politics at West Virginia University, Susan Webb Yackee, Director, La Follette School of Public Affairs Professor of Public Affairs and Political Science, received the 2019 Herbert A. Simon Career Contribution Award from the Midwest Public Administration Caucus, the highest award in the field of political science for the study of bureaucracy and public administration, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholar in Health Policy Research at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, worked as a legislative research assistant in the U.S. Senate, “Policies that Bind? The Use of Guidance Documents by Federal Agencies,” <https://jhhsa.spaef.org/file.php?id=1954>, DOA: 7/8/21, smarx, MLC]

One of the key distinctions between these two approaches hails from the differential procedural and process requirements for writing rules. Crucially, the APA establishes a specific process for issuing notice and comment regulations; however, it does not establish a corresponding process for issuing guidance documents. Moreover, since the APA’s passage in 1946, a number of additional procedural requirements have been imposed to further formalize the notice and comment process (Haeder & Yackee, 2015, 2018; J. W. Yackee & Yackee, 2010, 2016). Importantly, many of these requirements have been put into place to facilitate democratic accountability by increasing transparency and oversight of bureaucratic activities by elected officials. In contrast, agencies have far fewer requirements when issuing guidances (Romano, 2019).

The second crucial difference between notice and comment rules and guidances is that while the former has the force of law (i.e. they are “legally binding”), guidance documents do not (i.e. they are, technically speaking, not “legally binding”). At first blush, this difference appears quite important. However, in practice, it may be less so. As Shapiro (2014, p. 531) concludes, regulated entities generally comply with the requirements set forth in guidance documents “out of fear” of the agency. After all, as Mantel (2009) explains, agencies frequently use guidances as the basis for their policy enforcement actions—suggesting that “prudent” regulated entities may comply with guidances to avoid confrontations with those agency officials who hold power over them (Hickman, 2009, p. 240). Hwang et al. (2014, p. 770) add that “guidance documents remain controversial because, by providing the agency’s ‘thinking’ on interpretive reasoning or enforcement standards, they may have regulation-like effects.” Additionally, according to some scholars, bringing legal challenges to contest a guidance document is more difficult than for a notice and comment rule (Funk, 2001; Raso, 2010; Romano, 2019). When taken together, the above illustrates why some observers conclude that guidances may “bind” in practice, even if they do not, technically-speaking, bind by law (Anthony, 1992).

#### Capitalism eviscerates biodefense---extinction

Mark Prado ‘11 [Mark Evan Prado, a physicist in the Washington, D.C., region working for the Pentagon in advanced planning in the space program. “Human Extinction by Biotechnology and Nanotechnology.” [https://www.permanent.com/human-extinction-biotechnology-nano.html]//JM](https://www.permanent.com/human-extinction-biotechnology-nano.html%5d//JM)

As biotechnology has advanced, so has the power of the individual. In the past century, it took a country or rogue organization, a lot of money, and special skills to create a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Now, it takes just one person, the internet, and a small cheap lab. Instead of "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)", we are faced with "Weapons of Mass Extinction (WME)". For example, in 2011, in a surprise address to the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: "Less than a year ago, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for, and I quote, 'brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.'"Clinton-UN She also officially acknowledged the generally accepted situation that "A crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology" and noted that "it is not possible, in our opinion, to create a verification regime" for preventing biological weapons. This came just a few months after two independent developments -- a scientist in the Netherlands, and a team led by a Japanese scientist at the University of Wisconsin -- both announced that they had created viruses in the laboratory which are far more virulent than anything which had occurred naturally, potentially the most deadly virus ever faced by humans. Both were created by modifying the H5N1 Bird Flu virus in the laboratory. These scientists were apparently planning to publish their research openly soon after Clinton's address. The US government's National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a division of the National Institute of Health (NIH) requested they not publish the details. The NSABB has no legal authority, and is only an advisory organization. The authors disagreed with the decision but agreed to adhere to it. All the authors had already received funding from the NIH and it might be presumed they would continue to receive funding... unless they did not follow the request. After also being contacted by the NSABB, the two scientific journals, Nature and Science (two highly established journals), still planned to publish the two papers minus some of the details. The journal Science stated it would agree with the NSABB to refrain from publishing the details only if the government created a system whereby scientists worldwide could access the details if they had a legitimate need to know the information. However, at least one of the scientists had already presented his work at a major conference.SciAm-Albert Indeed, the editor of Science Magazine said "This finding shows its much easier to evolve this virus to an extremely dangerous state where it can be transmitted in aerosols [i.e., by coughing or sneezing] than anybody had recognized. NYTimes-1220 In 2011, folks. Imagine, as this news spreads around, and as technology advances even further, what the world will be like in 2020. Scientists are already saying it's not a matter of "if" but one of "when". These kinds of things cannot be kept secret. They will spread. Indeed, such news announcements stimulate interest. You can be sure that the news media will broadcast such gains very prominently, because it sells their service and makes them money, and can selfishly rationalize away the greater interests of our species. Keeping this kind of research secret is difficult. Pharmaceutical companies pay scientists for information and cooperation all the time. Others can pay scientists as well. There are still many scientists who rationalize their research as "not that dangerous" and/or is important for "defensive" purposes (kind've like other arms races) in order to promote their paid work, and when money is offered, many people can rationalize even more. It may not matter whether the money is offered by a pharmaceutical company or just a visiting consultant. It could even be an undercover agents posing as pharmaceutical company staff, either a front company or faked, or even a plant into a legitimate

## CP---Progressivism

### 2AC---CP---Progressivism

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the CP

#### Perm do the plan and call it progressivism

## DA---COMPETES

### 2AC---DA---COMPETES

#### Won’t pass

Litow ’3-2 [Stanley; 2022; Accenture Professor of the Practice at Duke University and a trustee at the State University of New York; Barron’s, “The Innovation Agenda America Needs,” https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-innovation-agenda-america-needs-51646254534]

The America Competes Act passed the U.S. House of Representatives a few weeks ago, with only one Republican vote. To become law, it must be reconciled with the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, which passed in the Senate last year with 19 Republican votes—evidence of powerful bipartisan support in the Senate. This kind of bipartisan support allowed a major infrastructure investment to pass, while in the stalled Build Back better legislation, the perfect became the enemy of the good. And no action has been taken. Finding the middle ground, accomplishing what needs to be done, and doing so by harnessing this support is in a word, essential. The stakes are high, and the torment on the international stage has only heightened them.

#### Tons of thumpers

Swartz ’22 [Jon; January 1; reporter, citing Bhaskar Chakravorti, dean of global business at the Fletcher School at Tufts University; MarketWatch, “Big Tech heads for ‘a year of thousands of tiny tech papercuts,’ but what antitrust efforts could make them bleed?” <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/big-tech-heads-for-a-year-of-thousands-of-tiny-tech-papercuts-but-what-antitrust-efforts-could-make-them-bleed-11640640776>]

This could finally change in 2022 as it did in the late 1990s, when some tech companies struck a cautious stance during the Justice Department’s investigation of Microsoft for monopolistic practices, Syed said.

“The difference is that we’re talking about interconnected companies that own an industry versus just one company [with Microsoft],” she said. “And there is bipartisan support, which makes it easier politically.”

With more than a dozen pieces of anti-tech legislation, a plethora of lawsuits and regulatory fines escalating in the U.S. and abroad, as well as the Biden administration rounding out Big Tech’s nightmare team of government agency heads, 2022 is shaping up as a seminal year for tech regulation after decades of inaction.

In rapid succession this year, Biden named and nominated an antitrust team of Tim Wu (to the newly created position of head of competition policy at the National Economic Council), Lina Khan (chair of the Federal Trade Commission) and Jonathan Kanter (head of the antitrust division of the Justice Department). Each is a heralded anti-monopolist advocate who has written extensively on the topic or represented companies making antitrust claims against Big Tech.

The trio have been referred to as members of a “New Brandeis movement,” named after Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, whose decisions limited the power of big business in the early 20th century. With the New Brandeis trifecta in place, and Congress evaluating more than dozen possible anti-tech bills, next year is “shaping up to be the year of Tech Takedown,” Bhaskar Chakravorti, dean of global business at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, told MarketWatch.

More troubling for tech CEOs, he said, are the “many tiny actions at the FTC, Justice Department and Congress that will continue to keep feeding the news cycles with a steady stream of actions” that add up to a “a year of thousands of tiny tech papercuts.”

Big Tech’s treacherous path to antitrust enforcement has three potentially damaging roads: federal agencies challenging acquisitions and mergers; legislation tailored to stimulate competition and curtail the influence of tech’s dominant platforms; and federal and state lawsuits.

### 2AC---AT: Climate Change

#### Won’t be implemented or modelled

Jan-Erik **Lane 18**. Professor emeritus at UNIGE, Geneva, Switzerland. 2018. “The Beginning of the End of the Climate Drama.” International Journal of Social Science Studies, vol. 6, pp. 32–44.

1. Introduction The prospects for decarbonisation halting climate change seems grim, especially if abrupt climate change theory is correct. The crux of the matter is energy, which still comes with a high corbon intensity in most countries. Energy is the capacity to do work, which is the foundation of affluence. Figure 1 brings this fact out clearly for 2017. [[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]] 2. Coordination Failure The COP21 Treaty, or any other similar agreement, would have two parts: i) reduction of C02 emissions ina certain pace towards zero emissions at some future date; ii) contributions to the Super Fund yearly according to some scheme and time table. Both these two actions concern first and foremost the countries in the G20 group of nations, responsible for 70 per cent of the total C02 emissions. Small poor nations can be left beside, as they pollute little and cannot be required to pay into the Super Fund. Both i) and ii) are just promises, which the COP21 Secretariat or the UN cannot enforce, strictly speaking. When a country receives support the Super Fund, there is some leverage to force obedience. However, a big poor country may simply refuse decarbonisation, if no assistance is provided. Decarbonisation is costly in the short run for all countries, as the must replace existing energy plants with new, hopefully renewable energy resources. Contriuting to the Super Fund is also costly in the short run. This sets up an interaction where a government may be tempted to defect from its promises to decarbonise or pay to the Super Fund. A. Stratey of poor nations: the N-1 problematic. Poor or small nations will engage in opportunism with guile in order to avoid too large costs with the COP21 decarbonisation policy, pretending they matter very little for outcomes. B. Strategy of the rich country: the 1/N problematic. Large or rich countries will find sacrifices that cannot be internalised as meaningless gifts to others, who may not be trusted to cooperate. Thus, the US reneged because it did not want to pay for decarbonisation in India. The PD nature of interaction in a global CPR like the COP21 Treary is fragile, to say the least. What is lacking is the instruments of control, as Hobbes pointed out already 1651 in hid Leviathan, speaking of voluntary agreements or accords: "Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all," 3. Ineffective Resilience Governments only pay lip service to the threat of human extinction. It is business as usual among the Great Powers, in the Middle East and South China Sea, in markets and financial institutions. This is not what climate and earth scientists would predict, but it is in accordance with social science theories of collective action. No time for utopian experiments, as time is tight (Stern, 2007, 2015). The chart below shows carbon intensity (fossil fuels/all energy) for a selection countries in the world. This is root cause of abrupt climate change, threatening mankind. The mean is as high as 85 %. Chart of Carbon Intensity [[CHART OMITTED]] The crux of resilience as strategy is energy, which still comes with a high corbon intensity in most countries. Energy is the capacity to do work, which is the foundation of affluence and human development. 4. The Anthroposcene Period: Likely End of Mankind? Scholars now say we face a new period in the history of human beings on Earth, the anthroposcene replacing the holoscene period. It would be characterised by mankind's domination over Nature, resulting in a quite new climate and ecological degradation. Yet, one could retork that it is now Nature that shrinks the degrees of freedom of men and women, making them victims of Nature's unpredictability and violence. In this perspective, the holoscene period antedating the anthroposcene beginging arund 1700, lasted for thousands of years. How long will the anthoposcene period last? The COP21 Accords were based on a belief that time was available for a slow decarbonisation, managing global warming at around + 2 degrees Celsius, stabilising climate sometimw 2076 - the carbon budget approach. These beliefs are now partially outdated. 5. Abrupt Climate Change Theory Recently launched, climate and earth scientists now focus upon so-called tipping points as well as the great variability in temperature increases over the entire globe. The dramatic changes in the Arctic have made researchers focus upon the melting of the ice at the poles and Greenland and its repurcussions for global weather and the huge methane holdings in the permafrost from Alaska to Siberia, both on land and in ocean. a) Tipping point 1: Arctic Sea ice; Expected to disappear around 2020, it will not increase sea levels dramatically due to the eqivalence between ice and water. But this will affect global oceans streams as well as global weather yet streams. b) Tipping point 2: Greenland ice; Uncertainty when it will be gone - some say 1940, this will raise sea levels some 6 meters. Major city areas will inundated: Miami, Rio de Janeiro, Venice, Kairo-Alexandria, Mumbai, Hanoi, Shanghai, Tokyo and Singapore, for instance. It would further deteriorate oceans conveyor belt and the slow the global jet stream. c) Tipping point 3: Antartica ice mass; this enormous mass of ice and glaciers would be finished by some 100-500 years, rising sea levels some 60-70 meters. Mankind stand to loose a lot of land all over the planet Earth - a true catastrophe. d) Tipping point 4: constant heat increase with draught and potable water scarcity. This would reuce food availability and lead to millions of climate refugees from vunerable low level coastline countries and poor nations along the equator. e) Tipping point 5: Methane emissions from the melting permafrost. This threat is so huge that mankind would never survive such a major release of CO2s. The idea of so-called tipping points is that it make concrete the Hawking notion of irreversibility. 6. Irreversibility: Its Entailment When S. Hawking suggested that climate change was irreversible, he was met wih sharp citicism. The notion of an irreversible process of change comes from the theory of scientific laws of nature with their universality and empirical necessity. If global warmin is unstoppable or inevitable, then the survival of the human race is at stake. The only way to reduce the speed of climate change, avoiding inevitability, is to stop pumping GHGs into the atmosphere. This requires inter alia: i) immediate stop to coal and charcoal in poor countries; ii) replacing fossil fuel enegy with solar panel parks of the Morroccan Quarzazate kind; iii) initiate now large scale geo-engineering experiments to suck up CO2s or sequestrate CO2s.. Will these measures be taken by the UNFCCC or the G20 group of nations? Probably not. Why? Becaause of the ocean PD game involved. What matters to all countries and governments is access to energy, the culprint of the anthroposcene period. 7. Energy and Human Needs The public and private sectors demand lots of energy to produce their goods and services. Energy, or the capacity to do work potentially or actually, is key in economic growth for enterprises and financula institutions in rich countries. And energy is absolutely essential in socio-econmic development in poor nations. But energy supply drives the emisions of GHGs, as energy consumption results in GHG emissions as long as fossil fuels dominate supply. Figure 2 shows most recent data abou the iron link between GDP, or economic output, and energy consumption, globally. [[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]] The cental position of economic growth in rich countries and of socio-economic development in poor countries is much in consonance with basic human drives as well as with the logic of vibrant capitalism in the global market economy. Governments and politicians cherish economic growth, because it makes more policy-making possible. Look at the evidence about the positive effects of energy in the figures below, linking energy consumption with human development indicators, The living conditions in the poor countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia as well as the Pacific reflects the low level of energy employed. This basic fact determines life opportunities in a most dramatic fashion. The low access to energy has consequences for the environment and the life situation of people, including health, schooling, work, food and potable water. For instance, African countries are poor because they have too little energy. Thus, they have much less GHGs than Asia. Yet, they need the COP project of the UNFCCC to renew their energy sources and move from fossil fuels and traditional renewables to solar power. Hydro power depends upon water availability that shrinks with global warming. African energy deficit is conducive to a dire environment with enormous damages and risks. Consider the following global figures. Figure 4 shows how low energy leads to am unsafe environmental. [[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]] Low energy use leads to poverty, malnutrition, deceases, lack of potable water, insufficient sanitation, etc. Typical of many Latin American, African and Asian nations is the lack of stable electricity, which hampers everything and reduces environmental viability. Figure 5 has the global picture. [[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]] The access to safe and stable electricity is crucial for health, schools, food, water, etc. Figure 6 links energy with proper sanitation. [[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]] Especially, the rapidly growing African, Latn American and Asian mega-cities lack entirely proper sewage plants. Thus, dirty water is put into the big rivers where other cities downstream take their potable water. The access to safe and stable electricity is crucial for health, schools, food, water, etc. Figure 4 links energy with proper sanitation. [[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]] Figure 7 underscores the necessity of more energy in poor coutries for prper sanitation, without which the life of humans is "salle". [[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]] Air quality too depends upon energy access (Figure 8). [[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]] Typical of many poor nations - Latin America, Africa, Asia - is the lack of predictable access to safe electricity, which hampers work and reduces environmental viability. The access to safe electricity is, it must be emphasized, absolutely central for health, schools, food, potaable water, etc. Given the lack of enough energy in poor countries being conducive to the above bad living conditions, one understands the hopes of the poor countries for help with energy transformation leading to better access to just energy! Given the above evidence about the positive consequences of energy for quality of life and life opportunities, one understand the position of the Third World at the Paris meeting that decarbonisation must be combined with great econoic assistance to make fundamental energy transfrmation. The result was the promise if a giant Super Fund, bit it is only a promise. 8. Projection of Energy: A Few Examples The decrbonisation goal of COP21 requires the support of the big countries in the world. But do they really aim at decarbonisation? We look at three examples here. India In Indian energy policies, it is emphasized that developmental goals take precedence over climate change considerations. Thus, all Indian household musst have access to electricity and only sustained rapid economic growth can reduce poverty. India has a "take-off' economy that delivers affluence for the first time since independence. But it is based on fossil fuels. India looks into other sources of energy, as long as socio-economic development is not hindered. Figure 9 shows the main features of India's future planning. [[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]] India has rapidly become a major CO2 emitter due to its high growth rates since 1990. It uses lots of coal, stone or wood. Charcoal is bad for households and results in forest destruction. India tries to broaaden its energy supply to modern renewables, like solar, wind and hydro power. Yet, it will remain stuck with fossil fuels for decades. It needs assistance from the COP21 project, especially for solar power parks. Building more dams is very risky, as global warming reduces water assets. Figure 9 indicates the India cannot meet its COP21 promises, as Ramesh (2015) underlines. India shows the same close link betwee GDP and energy consumption (Figure 10). [[FIGURE 10 OMITTED]] Given this close connection between GDP and energy consumption in India, the risk is of course that further socio-economic developments will increase GHG emissions. India is hardly on the decarbomisation road. USA The US has reduced its C02 emissions during the lats years, mainly by a shift to natural gas. Actually, several mature economies have been able to halt the rise of C02 emissions, either by more energy efficiency or a shift to natural gas or renewables. Figure 11 captures some features in US energy plans. [[FIGURE 11 OMITTED]] Although the Figure 9 predicts a doubling of renewable energy, the dependency upon fossil fuels, including coal energy, will not bee much reduced. We are talking here about relative numbers, but if the US increases total amount of energy supply - fracking!, then there may even be more fossil fuels. The reduction in CO2s during recent years seems to be coming at a reduced rate. The hope is for economic growth without energy increases, but we are not there yet. And most countries demand more energy for the future. [[FIGURE 12 OMITTED]] World Bank Data Indicators Although the link between GDG and energy consumption id Iress tight for he USA than India, reflecting that economic growth in advanced countries can be achieved without energy increase, it is still the case that the US is not on the road towards major decarbonisation. China China now enters the First World, as it has long passed its "take-off' point in time around 1980 and has pursued a successful "catch-up" policy for a few decades. Its energy consumption, especially fossil fuels, has skyrocketed with GDP, resulting in the largest C02 emission globally. Figure 13 has a projection for China. [[FIGURE 13 OMITTED]] Decarbonisation does not seem highly probable. Much hope was placed at a recent reduction in CO2s, but water shortages forced China to revert to coal in 2017 with attending augmentation of CO2s. China is investing in both renewables and atomic power, but it also plans for large energy increase in the coming decades with lots of energy consuming new projects. [[FIGURE 14 OMITTED]] Such a close connection between GDP and energy consumtion in China imples that China must turn to renewables massively in order to comply with COP21 goals. 9. Domestic Policy Concerns and International Coordination A government may bind the state it repesents to farreaching objectives like complete decarbonisation at an internatinal reunion, but it is just a "scrap of paper". It matters really press cncerning safeguarding national interests, the goverment simply reneges. When water becomes scare for Chinese energy dams. Then coal is resorted to again, with new C02 augmentation. Domestic politics play a major role in energy policy besides international accords. Here are three examples a) Japan's dilemma After the Fukushima disaster, Japan closed 50 of its 52 reactors. The country relies much upon the import of of various energy resources. Will Japanese politics allow a return ro nuclear power or will Japan like South Korea rely massively upon LNG from Australia? One possible scenario is ourlined in Figure 15- [[FIGURE 15 OMITTED]] b) Germany & France: nucleaar distrust Despite all propaganda about so-called Energiwende, Germany remain much dependent upon fossil fuels. High grade coal is imported from Russia and Colombia to add to its own low grade coal, besides all the natural gas from Gazprom. At the same time, nuclear power are closing - all up to 2022. France is also closing nuclear plants, despite the fact that they could be used longer and made safer. Both countries should turn to solar power - see Table 1, but may be expected to burn biomass or biotrash, which emits C02 inter alia. Table 1. Number of Ouarzazate plants for 40 per cent reduction of C02 in some giant countries (Note: Average of 250 300 days of sunshine used for all entries except Australia, Indonesia, and Mexico, where 300 - 350 was used). [[CHART OMITTED]] Sweden used to be lucky with energy resources, relying upon many rivers and modern high tech and very safe nuclear power stations. However, since 2000 it now abandons nuclear power at astronomical costs, relying instead upon the import of biomass or biotrash. GHG are now increasing in Sweden. Summing up: Climate change is more lethal than nuclear power plant accidents. 10. Conclusion The awareness of lethal climate change is on the increase with scientists, civil society and ordinary people. But the political elites remain myopic and opportunistic. The 21st century may be the last in the history of human beings. Why is there no action from G20 nations?

## DA---Midterms

### 2AC---DA---Midterms

#### Dems lose both chambers, but because of fundamentals, not policy.

Wagner ’2-18 [Rose; 2022; Congressional reporter; Courthouse News Service, “Midterms will likely cost Democrats the majority. That’s normal,” https://www.courthousenews.com/midterms-will-cost-democrats-the-majority-thats-normal/]

Experts call it likely that the majority in both chambers of Congress will flip to Republican control come November, but many don’t attribute that outcome to the stalled portions of the Democratic agenda.

Instead, they note that the president’s party losing seats in the midterms is a tradition that runs almost like clockwork, year after year in Washington.

#### No Latin American instability or escalation

Feinberg et al. 15—Richard Feinberg is a professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of IR and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego [Richard, “Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations; Harold Trinkunas is a senior fellow and director of Brooking’s Latin America Initiative am; Emily Miller is a Research Assistant at Brooking’s Latin America Initiative [“Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations,” *Latin America Initiative in Foreign Policy at Brookings*, March, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Better-Than-You-Think-Reframing-InterAmerican-Relations.pdf>]

Much of the contemporary U.S. policy toward the hemisphere has its roots in the 1990s. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the regional agenda became crowded with new initiatives and institutions: the Summit of the Americas, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, a reoriented Organization of American States (OAS) focused on democracy promotion and a reinvigorated Inter-American Court of Human Rights. At its core, this agenda was intended to consolidate and give regional institutional weight to core U.S. interests in the region, namely free elections, free markets, free trade and cooperative security. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States redoubled efforts to secure regional cooperation on combating terrorism and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Even if some specific initiatives have run aground, such as the FTAA, or have been troubled, such as recent Summits, the hemispheric agenda of the United States has by and large been achieved. In country after country, international and domestic actors have aligned to produce the triumph of democracy and sustainable market-based economies, leading a wave of democratization and liberalization that has swept the globe since the 1970s. The region experienced its last (brief) interstate conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, and the probability of war in Latin America is vanishingly small, an astounding achievement when compared to present troubles in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In addition, although international terrorism and proliferation have not vanished from the region, Latin America is far better off than any other part of the world on this security dimension.22

In contrast to 1980, democracy is now by and large consolidated, with only a few exceptions of backsliding (shown in Figure 5),23 and military coups have become increasingly rare. Latin American democracies have pioneered new forms of political and social inclusion, such as participatory budgeting and conditional cash transfer programs. Civil society has flourished across much of the region, and there is a vibrant media in many countries.

Across Latin America, we have generally witnessed stronger economic growth and better macroeconomic management during the past decade than in the previous two. In the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, bouts of hyperinflation and financial crises in the 1990s, regional political and economic leaders have been much more cautious, accumulating substantial international reserves and keeping close watch on inflation. By 2011, the nine largest economies in Latin America had, on average, accumulated reserves equivalent to 16 percent of GDP.24 At the end of 2013, Brazil was sitting on $376 billion and Mexico on $177 billion (Figure 6). Inflation has fallen dramatically from over 200 percent between 1990 and 1995 to an average of six percent since 2010.25

This improved macroeconomic management has produced significant reductions in poverty and improvements in social inclusion. The size of the middle class in Latin America has also nearly doubled since 2002,26 contributing to economic growth and new demands for improved governance. Figure 727 illustrates the sustained GDP per capita growth and poverty reduction beginning in 2003, which contrast with the income stagnation of the 1980s and modest improvements of the 1990s. Similarly, Figure 8 demonstrates consistent downward trends in inequality in some of the region’s largest economies.28 While Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world,29 it is clear that sound macroeconomic policies have contributed to improved social equity, either directly through broad-based growth, or indirectly through enabling states to finance targeted redistributive policies. The region’s rapid recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis is evidence of the strength of the macroeconomic policies and institutions that have prevailed thus far. This has meant that much of the region has needed fewer loans and external assistance, and also that Latin American leaders have less need to adhere to external conditions for financial support. For example, in 2014 the Brazilian economy slowed down but its external reserves are so large that it does not need to revert to the multilateral institutions for funds or advice. Rather, international markets and competitive pressures are tilting the internal debate in Brazil toward more market-friendly policies, as signaled by the recent appointments of a more orthodox finance minister, Joaquim Levy, and market-oriented politicians to the agriculture and industry portfolios.

Latin America has also expanded its participation in global trade and its range of trading partners. In conjunction with a fall in average tariffs from 39 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 2005, Latin America’s export volume quadrupled.30 There is now a broad array of free trade agreements in place across the region, not only among Latin American states but also with China, Europe and the United States. This tangible multi-polarity offers nations more options for economic development and export-led growth. For example, growing commodity exports toward China during the 2000s (Figure 9) reflects rising demand relative to traditional Latin American export markets such as Europe and the United States. Latin America’s diversified trade is not the “fault” of U.S. policy inattention but rather a reflection of structural shifts in the global economy. For Latin America, this is a healthy development because it reduces the risks of being tied to the economic prospects of any one region of the world; vulnerabilities of course remain, as South America depends heavily on commodity exports and Central America and Mexico are subject to the ups and downs of the U.S. economy.

Inter-state peace in Latin America has become the status quo. States in the region rarely militarize disputes, and civil conflicts have declined as well; Figure 10 plots civil and international conflicts as measured by magnitude scores that reflect “societal-systemic impact.”31 According to Figure 10, the only nations currently plagued by major episodes of civil violence are Colombia and Mexico, both drug-fueled conflicts.32 Even though most states in the region continue to share some disputed borders, such sources of friction are by and large the province of diplomats and lawyers arguing cases at the International Court of Justice in The Hague rather than of armies.33 Latin America has in place a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the two leading nuclear technology powers, Argentina and Brazil, have a longstanding non-proliferation institution, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), that monitors their mutual rejection of the pursuit of nuclear weapons.34 While fears about international terrorism in the region have occasionally made headlines in the United States post 9/11, the last major incidents occurred in 1992 and 1994 when Hezbollah agents attacked the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires. In its most recent report on terrorism in the region, the U.S. State Department maintained that the majority of terrorist attacks in Latin America were committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However such tactics by transnational criminal organizations and insurgents in the hemisphere are largely aimed at domestic audiences rather than linked to international terrorist networks.35

The bottom line is that since the end of the Cold War, Latin America has advanced far and fast along a number of political, security, economic and social dimensions. It is impossible to untangle the relative weight of the external and internal factors contributing to this felicitous outcome, but it is safe to say that Latin American countries have made themselves much more democratic, peaceful and prosperous, and that past instruments of U.S. influence, when smartly deployed, have largely worked themselves out of a job. These achievements are deeply compatible with longrange core U.S. interests in regional peace, democracy and human rights, market-based economies and free trade. As such, a return to a mid-20th century interventionist foreign policy is neither feasible nor desirable.

# 1AR

## Adv---Solvency

### 1AR---AT: No Antitrust in 1AC

#### Doesn’t say word “antitrust”---says nationalization, which is a type of antitrust---their generic args are inapplicable

**Hewitt 21** [Liane Hewitt, historian of political economy and international order at Princeton, Economic History Workshop is a monthly seminar series for Princeton students and faculty interested in the study of economic history, co-sponsored by the Department of History at Princeton and the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance, the workshop provides a forum for scholars to present their findings and receive feedback on their research in a wide array of subfields, such as financial, business, labor, legal, intellectual, technological, and social history, Nationalization as Anti-Trust Policy: The Post-War Anti-Fascist Moment in France, Britain and West-Germany, 1944-51,” Feb 4, 2021, https://jrc.princeton.edu/events/hewitt-spring-2021]

This dissertation asks how international cartels became rejected after the Second World as the private scaffolding for organizing European capitalism and international order. After 1918, a broad consensus of actors (governments, politicians, legal and economic experts, and sectors of socialists, labor and consumer groups) boosted cartels as a near-panacea for stabilizing chaotic markets, securing the fragile peace, and building a common market that could hold its own against American Fordist mass-production and distribution. This chapter argues that the sweeping nationalization reforms enacted at the end of WW2 by Britain and France, under the Attlee Labour government and the Resistance-controlled Constituent Assembly respectively, should be seen as pivotal episodes in Western Europe’s anti-cartel turn. This interpretation brings together two traditionally separate historiographies: the first on the post-war social-democratic moment and the construction of national welfare states, and the second more technical literature on post-1945 de-cartelization. The chapter suggests that governments and activists justified nationalization as an anti-trust policy to defeat the anti-democratic, perhaps even fascistic power of private big-business over the state and national economic life. The organized Left had proposed comprehensive nationalization reforms since the end of WW1. But it was not until the anti-fascist and Liberation moment swept Britain and France in the wake of the victory of 1944-45 that governments took control of the commanding heights of their economies: notably credit, energy (gas, coal), transport, and iron and steel (in Britain, only). The chapter will conclude by briefly considering alternative national solutions to the cartel problem after 1945, which did not involve state nationalizations in Scandinavia and West Germany. American occupation and a weaker post-war anti-fascist moment in these countries may hold the key to explaining why they did not take the nationalization-as-antitrust policy route.

## CP---Word PIK

### 1AR---Solvency

#### More ev---DPS specifically is key

Kotz 8 - economics professor at Amherst (David, https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/What\_Ec\_Struc\_Soc\_08\_03.pdf, emuse)

The economic problems of actually existing socialism were not inherent in socialism, or in economic planning. They were structural problems of the particular form of planning that first arose in the Soviet Union and later appeared in other Communist Party ruled states. All of the economic problems listed in section 2 above were due to a key feature of that form of socialism: an absence of popular participation in decision-making in the economy and the state. There were various problematic policies, but the foregoing structural feature was the underlying source of the economic problems.5 Economic activity in any system will serve the needs of those who have power within that system. In a market economy ordinary consumers have a limited power -- they can decide not to purchase something. Hence, producers have be concerned with what ordinary consumers want to buy, since that is something they cannot fully control, try though they may. In Soviet-type planning, those actors with power were able to get high quality goods produced for them. No one ever claimed that Soviet weapons were of low quality, yet they were produced via the system of central planning. Soviet military leaders, and the ministers in charge of production of military equipment, were powerful and could demand high quality products. Similarly, some of the industrial ministers in civilian sectors had the power to demand high quality products, and some Soviet industrial products were world class.6 Special enterprises produced housing for high officials, and the quality of such housing was excellent.7 Powerful Soviet officials exercised their power by their ability to discipline or demote top enterprise officials if product quality was deemed unsatisfactory. It was an effective incentive. By contrast, ordinary households had almost no power in the Soviet planning system. Enterprise managers were not rewarded and punished based on how well they satisfied household consumers. The environmental damage from Soviet-type central planning resulted from an unaccountable leadership's focus on economic growth. The absence of democratic rights for the population prevented the emergence of a strong environmental movement that could have insisted on changed priorities. For economic planning to work effectively, power must be dispersed among all of the relevant groups in the economy, not monopolized by unaccountable high officials. Models of participatory planning have been elaborated by a number of authors (Devine, 1988, 2002; Albert and Hahnel, 1991). They involve democratic participation both in the economy and the state, which must be closely intertwined in a socialist system. These models share the following five principles: 1) wide participation in decision-making by those affected by a decision; 2) representation of the population as workers, community members, and consumers on decision-making bodies; 3) a decision-making process based on negotiation and compromise, to handle the inevitable existence of opposing interests among different groups; and 4) an equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of economic and political life. If consumer representatives sat on enterprise boards and on regional and national level planning bodies, they could insist that enterprises produce high quality consumer goods that people would like to purchase, with the power to set rewards and penalties to back up their demands. If the top political leaders are dependent on popular support for staying in office, they would be under pressure to make the system work to meet the needs of ordinary people. Democratic institutions, which in a capitalist system are always limited by the enormous political power of the rich, would work far better in a socialist system that has no class of wealthy property owners. The promise of getting rich is not necessary to build an efficient, innovative economy. "Innovation Institutes" could fund the testing out of new ideas, new products, and new services. Someone with a proposal for a new restaurant or service establishment could apply for funds and leasing rights to carry out their proposal, without departing from the principle of public ownership of productive property. Modest material rewards should be sufficient to encourage innovation and new and varied services, given the presence in any population of many individuals who are personally inclined to launch new projects. By providing representation for all constituencies in the making of allocation decisions, participatory planning would provide channels for all groups to see that their needs are addressed. It also recognizes the existence of conflicting interests even in a socialist society and provides institutions in which groups can negotiate and reach compromises. For example, enterprise boards having representatives of workers, consumers, and the community could strike a reasonable balance among workers' interest in not being overworked, consumers' interest in affordable and well-made products, and the community's interest in avoiding pollution of air and water. In a country having a relatively low living standard, a system of participatory planning would allow the population to demand a high rate of economic growth though democratic decisions about the resources to be devoted to investment and improved technologies. For participatory planning to work effectively, economic decisions should be as decentralized as possible to facilitate maximum participation by affected parties. Old-style central planning was overly centralized. Some economic decisions must be made at the center, but many can be made at a regional or local level. The claim that a system based on free markets is superior to any other in efficiency, innovation, and growth has no foundation. While a capitalist market economy can develop the forces of production and bring a rising level of material consumption for part of the population, history shows that it has been unable to build a society that meets the needs of the entire population. Only socialism can assure everyone material comfort, security, and a guaranteed opportunity to participate in productive labor, without some exploiting others. Only socialism can build a society based upon the better aspects of human nature, rather than its baser aspects, and finally enable people to become the real masters of their fate. But socialism can carry out this historic mission only if it embraces democracy and popular participation as the basis of its institutions.

#### “Democratically Planned Socialism” is a term of art - refers to specific model of socialist development

**TUDOREANU 20**- PhD in Philosophy(MIHNEA, <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3145&context=dissertations_2>, EM)

There have been several different proposed models for a democratically planned socialist economy, including the system of negotiated coordination put forward by Devine (1988), the participatory economics envisioned by Albert and Hahnel (1991), and the computerized "new socialism" of Cockshott and Cottrell (1993). They differ in important respects, but they all share similar criticisms of the Soviet system and propose a type of socialism that is more democratic, both in the state and within the workplace. This has important consequences for innovation. First, merely having an open and democratic society, with elected representatives answerable to a voting public, would go a long way towards fixing some of the shortcomings of the Soviet model. Such a society would not invest in useless "prestige goods" that do not improve anyone's welfare, and - assuming that voters are concerned about their own future and that of their children - steps would be taken to develop environmentally-friendly technologies and innovations that make use of renewable energy sources.

## DA---Midterms

### 1AR---T/L

#### Also Biden isn’t key—Reyes says- Biden tried to end this program, only to have a federal judge order its reinstatement

#### Can’t turn case---dems are neocons too

Razo 17 (Hans, https://progressivearmy.com/2017/08/01/republicans-democrats-and-even-bernie-sanders-support-u-s-imperialism/, EM)

U.S. imperialism and American neoconservatism are pretty much like a religion at this point. From what I’ve seen, they seem to hold the belief that “The United States is the greatest country on Earth; thus, its government should seek to promote ‘democracy’ all around the world, even using force if necessary.” Of course when they are talking about spreading “democracy,” it is just a bunch of lies and lip-service to the American public, so the establishment and the mainstream media can manufacture consent within the American population. The reason why I believe these are a bunch of lies is that the history of U.S. imperialism has constantly shown us that the United States only cares about big corporations and the military-industrial complex. There are plenty of reasons to believe this that are exemplified by the coup in Chile I mentioned above, the [coup in Honduras](https://www.democracynow.org/2016/4/13/hear_hillary_clinton_defend_her_role) backed by the United States, the [regime changes in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan](http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/07/iraq-afghanistan-libya-countries-u-s-regime-changed-going-chaos.html), the [U.S.-backed war in Yemen](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/), led by human rights violator Saudi Arabia, the U.S.-backed Fascist Dictator [Fulgencio Batista](http://www.globalresearch.ca/cuba-pre-1959-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-u-s-backed-dictator-with-links-to-the-mob/5464738) from Cuba and the [CIA’s 634 attempts to kill Fidel Castro](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/26/fidel-castro-cia-cigar-assasination-attempts), the ongoing [U.S. support for Israel in its task of stealing Palestinian land](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/israel-sign-record-38bn-military-aid-deal-160914135203821.html) and creating an apartheid state against Muslims, and the [American sabotage of Venezuela’s economy](http://www.mintpressnews.com/us-led-economic-war-not-socialism-tearing-venezuela-apart/218335/) only because it is anti-imperialist. Now we can tell the U.S. doesn’t engage in wars or interventions in other countries just for the sake of being “humanitarian” or “spreading democracy.” The United States has committed many atrocities on foreign soil and created lasting problems in those countries. Now we need to recognize one thing: No major political party is against U.S. imperialism. Both [the Democrats and the Republicans](http://www.globalresearch.ca/republicans-vs-democrats-two-neoliberal-war-parties-with-the-same-economic-and-foreign-policies/5558341) have a long history of supporting the Military-industrial complex by participating in various interventions during the course of most of the 20th century and the U.S. has engaged in [continual intervention for the past 17 years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations). This may come as a surprise, but even [Bernie Sanders has a troubling record regarding wars](http://www.alternet.org/election-2016/bernie-sanders-troubling-history-supporting-us-military-violence-abroad). Bernie Sanders openly supported Clinton’s War in Kosovo in 1999. When Sanders was Burlington’s Mayor in the 80s, many people protested outside the local General Electric plant because it was manufacturing weapons so they could be used to fight socialists in Central America. “He lined up with union officials and watched as the police made arrests, saying later that in blocking the plant, the activists were keeping workers from their jobs,” reported the [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/us/politics/as-mayor-bernie-sanders-was-more-pragmatic-than-socialist.html?_r=0). Bernie Sanders also supported the construction of a [$1.2 trillion dollar stealth fighter](http://www.thedailybeast.com/bernie-sanders-loves-this-dollar1-trillion-war-machine), even though his constituency opposed it. Sanders claimed he was against the Iraq War, but he never mentioned he voted in favor of the [Iraq Liberation Act of 1998](https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/105/hr4655/text), which explicitly said that it was the U.S.’s duty to topple Saddam Hussein. Sanders also backed a resolution that gave congressional backing to the CIA, which allowed it to do a covert plan to remove Hussein and also impose economic sanctions on Iraq, which may have killed as many as 500,000 children, according to [Counterpunch](https://www.counterpunch.org/2016/02/16/blood-traces-bernies-iraq-war-hypocrisy/). Let’s remember that Sanders as a congressman didn’t support [Rep. Barbara Lee in her opposition to the Afghanistan War](http://www.salon.com/2016/09/17/barbara-lee-the-bad-news-is-perpetual-war-the-goods-news-is-that-the-left-is-stronger-than-ever/), since Sanders didn’t vote against the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which allowed then-President Bush to invade Afghanistan. Yeah, all of this happened years ago, but if you want something more recent we can note Sanders’s support for [Obama’s kill list, his backing of troops in Syria](http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Bernie-Sanders-Says-US-Kill-List-Legal-Backs-Troops-in-Syria-20160426-0017.html), and the fact that he said if he were to become President of the United States he would continue [to use drones](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/11/bernie-sanders-drones-counter-terror) in the Middle East.. It is definitely troubling that the biggest representative of the Democratic Party’s left has to be a pro-war politician. This diminishes the anti-war faction on the left, alienating them and also putting foreign policy discussion off the table. Many progressives think that Sanders would give a big punch to the Military-industrial complex because he voted against the Iraq War, but let’s remember Obama did that also and he ended up being a war hawk. We need to organize against war and be wary about who are really pro-peace politicians because there are many wolves in sheep’s clothing on the left, and if you will back neocons only because they will give you domestic benefits, stop calling yourself a leftist.

### 1AR---UQ---Midterms

#### Dems are hopeless in the next elections.

Wagner ’2-18 [Rose; 2022; Congressional reporter, citing Frances Lee, professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University; Courthouse News Service, “Midterms will likely cost Democrats the majority. That’s normal,” https://www.courthousenews.com/midterms-will-cost-democrats-the-majority-thats-normal/]

But experts say the reason Democrats will likely lose control of the Speaker’s chair and give up power in the Senate after November is not largely because of failed legislation, but because the president’s party almost always loses seats in midterm elections.

Midterms are a Losing Game

“Every midterm, this is what we see, that the president's party underperforms and typically loses seats, and usually quite a lot. And the pattern seems to be worse in a president's first term,” Lee said.

In 17 of the 19 midterm elections since World War II, the president’s party has lost seats in the House, according to data from the Brookings Institution.

Democrats simply don’t have any cushion to lose the seats that typically flip during midterms and still maintain control of Congress.

Biden’s approval rating has been swinging in the low 40s, which would typically signal a loss of about two dozen seats in the House, according to Lee.

Republicans need to gain only five seats to get control of the lower chamber, and the loss of a single Senate seat would spell the end of Democratic reign in the Senate.

"At this juncture, it would be quite surprising if Democrats managed to hold on control of Congress in the in the midterms. Historically, I mean, the pattern is so predictable," Lee said. "It's sort of baked in, it's just a question of how many and the Democrats have none to spare."

Political scientists give a myriad of reasons for why midterms tend to punish the sitting president’s party, from a lack of momentum among voters outside of presidential elections, to voter approval of the sitting president typically declining during his first couple of years in office.

#### Polling numbers are dire.

Salamy ’2-14 [Elissa; 2022; reporter, citing Dr. Mark Caleb Smith, director of the Center for Political Studies at Cedarville University; ABC 15 News, “With Biden's low approval numbers, midterms could be 'even worse' for Democrats,” https://wpde.com/news/connect-to-congress/with-bidens-low-approval-numbers-midterms-could-be-even-worse-for-democrats-gop-republicans-cedarville-university-elections-congress-inflation-afghanistan-ukraine-white-house]

Dr. Mark Caleb Smith, director of the Center for Political Studies at Cedarville University, said Biden’s polling numbers don’t bode well for the upcoming midterm elections.

“There's no way you can really sugarcoat this for the White House or for President Biden. These are not good numbers,” said Smith to The National Desk’s Jan Jeffcoat.

Historically, the sitting president’s party loses seats during the midterm elections.

“With approval numbers like this, you wonder if it's going to be even worse for the Democrats,” said Smith. “The data suggests that his decline is really coming from his own party, which I think is even worse for the president. It reflects the tension within the Democratic Party right now over the progressive wing and the more moderate wing.”

Historically, Biden’s approval ratings are “worse than every other president at this point, except for Donald Trump.”

“His numbers are worse than Gerald Ford. They're worse than Jimmy Carter. They're worse than George Herbert Walker Bush,” said Smith. “All those presidents went on to lose their next election.”

Another poll from the Pew Research Center shows just 20% of Americans believe Biden will be a successful president. Forty-three percent believe he will be unsuccessful and 37% think it is too early to tell.

“There are real problems on the ground,” said Smith. “We have generational inflation rates right now. Food prices are higher, gasoline is higher, appliances cost more, cars cost more, and since wages aren't keeping up with that, Americans are looking at a real decline in their standard of living.”

In addition, Smith said Biden is struggling with problems on the world stage.

“Problems in Afghanistan, emerging problems in Ukraine right now. The White House just simply looks weak, and it looks unable to deal with these crises,” said Smith. “More than anything, I think President Biden needs to lead. He needs to make a very clear direction and say, this is where we're going, this is how we're going to get there.”

#### Dems lose the House.

Kilgore ’2-6 [Ed; 2022; reporter; the New York Magazine, “Democrats Need More Than Redistricting Wins in 2022,” https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/02/democrats-need-more-than-redistricting-wins-in-2022.html]

It ain’t over until it’s over, and there’s already talk that Republicans might retaliate for Democratic success in New York by tilting maps even further red in states like Florida. But all this talk of net gains or losses via redistricting misses a much larger point: The real threat to Democratic control of the House was never redistricting, but rather the normal midterm popular-vote swing against the party controlling the White House. Redistricting was a lagniappe (in New Orleans parlance, “a little something extra”) when it came to 2022 House prospects. Democrats may get to enjoy this cherry on top of their sundae — but only if they’re actually served dessert.

Anyone who takes this redistricting news and extrapolates that Democrats are likely to keep the House in November is really missing most of the trees that make up the forest. People hastily reading Wasserman’s Donkey-rific take on redistricting might have missed this proviso: “A 42 percent President Biden approval rating could still equate to several dozen losses in November, and Republicans remain overall favorites for the House majority.” “Several dozen” is a lot more than the “two to three seats” Democrats are expected to net from redistricting.

Now it’s true that Biden’s job-approval rating could go up by November, with some presidential skill and luck. But there are only a few occasions (the 1998 and 2002 elections) when the president’s party actually gained House seats in the midterms, or even lost fewer than a dozen House seats (as happened in 1954, 1962, 1986). And Biden is an impossibly long way from the over-60 approval ratings (and positive right-track assessments for the direction of the country) that prevailed on those occasions.

Aside from the downward pressure on Democrats exerted by Biden’s relative unpopularity, the consistency of midterm national House popular-vote swings we’ve seen in both directions recently can’t be wished away. Compared with the presidential elections that preceded them, the House popular vote swung toward Democrats by 8 percent in 2018 and 10.6 percent in 2006, the last two times Republicans controlled the White House. When Democrats controlled the White House under Obama, the House popular vote swung toward Republicans by 17.4 percent in 2010 and 7.8 percent in 2014. Anything remotely like these shifting results should be far more than enough to flip the House, as it flipped in 2006, 2010, and 2018. Democrats won the House popular vote by 4.1 percent in 2020. Getting close to that in the current environment would be amazing.

Obviously things could change between now and November, with positive COVID-19 and economic trends benefitting Democrats and adverse developments in the U.S. Supreme Court (notably a potential reversal of Roe v. Wade) and excessive visibility for Donald Trump hurting Republicans. And surprisingly good redistricting results should mitigate Democrats’ 2022 losses, which could matter a lot by putting them in position to reclaim the House in 2024.

But let’s not get carried away and start enthusing about what Biden and a Democratic Congress might be doing a year from now. Democrats holding the House in 2022 is still a long shot, it’s just gotten a little less unlikely thanks to some skillful map-drawing by their allies around the country.

### 1AR---AT: Link

#### Energizes turnout---specific to socialism

Czarnecki '20 [Sean; 1/20/20; senior reporter for PR at Business Insider; "Edelman Trust Barometer: Most of world’s population down on capitalism," https://www.prweek.com/article/1671233/edelman-trust-barometer-worlds-population-down-capitalism/]

Trust in both society’s institutions and capitalism is strained despite strong economic performance, according to Edelman’s 2020 Trust Barometer. The study found that 56% of the global population said "capitalism as it exists today does more harm than good in the world." Most people also said traditional institutions, such as government, media, business and NGOs, don’t have a vision for the future that they can get behind. Fewer than half of respondents said government (35%), media (35%) and business (41%) have a vision for the future. NGOs received the highest approval at 45%. Now in its 20th year, the 2020 Trust Barometer’s results upended conventional wisdom that GDP growth correlates with higher trust, said Edelman global CEO Richard Edelman. This is the result of the broad belief that prosperity is not being fairly distributed. The study was originally built on the work of political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who advocated that economic mobility supported by a strong legal system could sustain and develop trust. However, events following the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing recession proved to Edelman that model may "not [be] sufficient," he said. While much of the media narrative about socialism has focused on young people, Edelman said his work found little difference among age groups, noting the belief that capitalism does more harm than good is "universal." Fifty-three percent of respondents over the age of 55 said capitalism does more harm than good, as was the case with 57% of the 18-to-34 age group and 59% of people ages 35 to 54. "The essential truth is: people are scared," Edelman added. "Their fears are overcoming their hopes." In 15 of the 28 markets surveyed, most people said they will not be better off in five years, including the U.S., where only 43% of respondents said so, representing a 7% decline.